

Bendary

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Past and Present*

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The aim of "The Russian Review" is to present a non-partisan interpretation of Russian history, civilization, and culture. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article in this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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Foreword

The Russian Review, 1941-1949

By DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT

BEGINNING with the present issue, *The Russian Review* will appear as a quarterly. Fourteen issues have been published since the Review started as a semi-annual in the Fall of 1941. It seems appropriate, at this time, to present the reader with a brief review of what has been done and to trace the course for the future.

In his Foreword to the first issue, William Henry Chamberlin, then editor, stated the main objectives of the Review: it was to provide a broad survey of the Russian scene, political, historic, economic, and cultural; it was to be a free forum giving the contributors full freedom of expression, while at the same time avoiding propaganda, from either the left or the right; finally, the Review was to be addressed not only to the specialist, but to a broad group of Americans who are seriously and intelligently interested in Russian affairs.

Measured by these standards, how well has the Review fulfilled its objectives?

In the eight years of its existence, *The Russian Review* has presented the following type of material:

- (1) Surveys of internal conditions in the U.S.S.R. and of current diplomatic trends
- (2) Russian-American and Soviet-American contacts, including sketches of figures who played a significant part in them (Father Gallitsin, Charles Crane, Cassius Clay)
- (3) Interpretive biographies of some of the outstanding Russian pre-revolutionary political and literary figures (Count Witte, P. Stolypin, Vladimir Soloviev, P. Durnovo)
- (4) Surveys of Soviet and émigré literary trends
- (5) Surveys of important historical trends and developments—external (Russia's relations with Western European powers) and internal (Church and State relationship, the Narodnik movement, etc.)
- (6) Articles on Russian folklore and the fine arts

- (7) Periodic surveys of the status of Russian studies and research in the United States
- (8) Translations from Russian classics
- (9) Book reviews and bibliographies.

From the above outline it would seem that the material has been varied in scope and broadly interpretive in nature. In the future the editors propose to continue the publication of a similar type of material. An additional feature is contemplated, that of surveying periodically important Soviet publications, particularly in the field of historical and literary scholarship. The editors would appreciate suggestions from the readers as to new material and specific topics of interest.

Inevitably, the greater number of the articles have been contributed by Russians. Among them were former statesmen, political leaders, scholars, and men of letters, of pre-revolutionary Russia. Essentially Western European in training and outlook, these contributors represent the flower of pre-revolutionary intelligentsia and are, perhaps, the last spiritual links between national Russian and Western European culture. The Review is happy to continue to provide an organ of expression for this group of contributors.

Fewer in number are contributions by American scholars and journalists. As yet, there is a scarcity of native American writers on Russia. One of the current efforts which the editors of the Review are engaged in is to find and encourage native Americans as contributors, particularly young Americans who are now doing graduate work in the field of Russian and Slavic studies. A measure of success in that direction has been achieved, though much remains to be done.

One of the most serious problems confronting the editors is the increasing scarcity of material on contemporary Soviet Russia. Further contraction of facilities of first-hand observation of the U.S.S.R. since World War II, has made material, which is not propaganda, practically unobtainable. For articles in this field, the Review has largely relied on a relatively few individuals who systematically follow the Soviet press and who, in the judgment of the editors, are capable of interpreting it intelligently and without undue bias.

Thirty years after the Revolution, Russia is still a tremendously controversial subject. Complete "aloof objectivity," as Mr. Chamberlin has pointed out, is probably unobtainable. Yet, every effort has been made for a balanced presentation, both in the selection of

articles and of contributors. This effort will be continued. One of the perennial difficulties in this connection is that some contributors often under-estimate the changes wrought by the Revolution, while others are frequently scarcely aware of the many elements of continuity in Russia's historical tradition.

The nature of the Review—its predominantly serious character—limits its appeal to a wide public. Circulation has been growing, but slowly. Apparently, there is only a comparatively small group of American readers sufficiently interested in Russian affairs to read a magazine of this type. Yet a great deal could be done if the present subscribers would make the Review better known. At present, most of the important university and public libraries in the United States and Canada are subscribers. Since World War II an increasing number of subscriptions have been received from Europe, Asia, and Australia. Most encouraging, perhaps, are the occasional unsolicited letters of commendation from educators and writers in this country and abroad which praise the Review as an informative and unbiased interpreter of Russia's past and present. Increasingly the Review is being used as a teaching aid in American college courses in Russian history, literature, and civilization. Many requests have been made recently for permission to reprint specific articles. These developments are encouraging and would seem to show that the Review is performing a much needed and timely function.

The New Soviet Emigration

By GEORGE FISCHER

I

A STRIKINGLY large number of Soviet Russians have become exiles since World War II. Americans, however, know little about these Russians, less publicized and far more numerous than the Kasenkinas, the Kravchenkos, the Krivitskys and the Barmines.

Unlike these spotlighted individuals whom official Soviet assignment took abroad, it was World War II which swept the new Soviet emigration into Western Europe. This group today consists predominantly of three categories: Soviet prisoners of war, forced laborers used by Germany throughout Nazi-occupied Europe, and—the smallest group—Soviet Russians who went over to the German side during the war on their own volition.

An additional fourth category of Soviet émigrés is of more recent origin. It consists of Soviet military and civilian personnel who have entered the Western-occupied zones of Germany and Austria since the end of World War II. Arriving at a peak rate of hundreds a month, most of these were members of the Soviet occupational forces.

There are no reliable figures on just how many Soviet nationals were prisoners of war and forced laborers during World War II. In the first confusion following VE Day, millions of them undoubtedly returned to Russia without being accounted for by Allied or Soviet statistics. Another large group might have shed its Soviet identity immediately. Secret war-time German figures may provide the most complete answer.

American officials and journalists interviewed this summer in the U. S. Zone of Germany estimated that between eight and eleven million Soviet nationals had been under German control at the end of World War II. Most of these were prisoners of war and forced laborers.

The Yalta Agreement, concluded by the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Great Britain in February, 1945, provided for the exchange between the signatory powers of all nationals who had been captured by the enemy during World War II. In the period immediately following Allied victory over Germany, U. S. Army commanders and officials of UNRRA as a rule complied strictly with

this agreement. With American assistance or at least knowledge, Soviet officials were able to carry out repatriation of Soviet nationals from areas occupied by U. S. troops at the time, including those in Germany, France, Italy, and Austria.

The partially forced repatriation to the U.S.S.R. led to a wave of suicides, disorders in Displaced Persons camps, and wholesale fleeing of Soviet nationals from the jurisdiction of Allied military commanders. Forced repatriation did not arouse much protest from a Western public opinion grateful to a great war ally. The recalcitrant Russian repatriates were often considered pro-German traitors and collaborators. And in general their fate was felt to be up to the Soviet government. The concept of recognizing and harboring men as political exiles was not applied to these Soviet Russians at the time.

At present, the Yalta Agreement provisions on repatriation of Soviet nationals appear to be still in effect formally. But a statement by General Joseph T. McNarney, then Military Governor of the U. S. Zone of Germany, discontinued forced repatriation less than two years ago.

Mainly due to this forced repatriation of Soviet nationals to their homeland, a sizable segment of them never even entered DP camps, while many others left them soon.

It is from this moment that the size, whereabouts, and real identity of the Soviet emigration as a whole and of most of its individual members became a complete mystery to the International Refugee Organization, UNRRA's successor, as well as to U. S. officials, newspapermen, and voluntary relief organizations.

Thus, today, no exact information can be obtained on these Soviet "non-returns" (*nevozvrashchentsy*), as they often call themselves. Despite a more favorable policy of the U. S. in the recent past, a large majority still fears a change of U. S. policy, as well as new instances of Soviet persecution if their identity is revealed.

In striking contrast to the "White" Russian emigration, which followed the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the new Russian émigrés have thus overwhelmingly changed their national identification, at least for the time being.

By far most of the new Soviet émigrés are massed in the American zone of Germany, and more particularly in Bavaria, its south-eastern part. Perhaps the largest proportion has maintained DP status, which means being under Allied rather than German jurisdiction and receiving some IRO assistance in food, housing, and immigration.

DP status was retained by these Russians not as Soviet nationals, however, but mainly as nationals of the Baltic Republics or of Poland. There are also some Soviet Russians known to be disguised as Hungarian, Yugoslav, Rumanian, and Bulgarian DPs.

A considerable number of Soviet Russians in and out of DP camps have taken on the "stateless" status which was formerly linked with the issuance of a "Nansen passport" by the League of Nations. This category originally included most of the old "White" Russian émigrés among the DPs, who had lived mainly in the Balkans between the two great wars. It is an ironic but frequent sight to find youngish Soviet exiles, many of them erstwhile Communists and Komsomols, today posing as "White" Russians.

Apart from the Soviet émigrés who are still classed as DPs, there are many who are living completely under German jurisdiction and conditions.

The wide-spread change of identity among the Soviet émigrés, involving their names and nationality, has been tacitly acknowledged by IRO and the German administration.

The "USSR" category of DPs in the U. S. Zone of Germany, according to an IRO "Summary of D. P. Population" of July 7, 1948, is 1452. This pigmy number is in striking contrast to estimates made verbally this summer by officials, newspapermen, and ex-Soviet Russians in Germany. Their "guestimate" goes up to 1,000,000 or more for the entire "non-returner" group. This, of course, includes those elsewhere in Western Europe as well as those who have migrated overseas in the past three years. A sizable group, for instance, estimated up to 100,000, is believed to have shed its Soviet identity in France with the end of World War II, and merged with either the old Russian émigrés or the French population.

Today Soviet refugees are migrating overseas at an increasing rate. Their destination ranges from North Africa and the British dominions to North and South America. The U. S. Congressional legislation to allow entry of over 200,000 displaced persons, has stirred great hopes among the Soviet émigrés, and the first ship to the U. S. with "DP Bill" in October, 1948, reportedly included some 20 Soviet Russians. But again no complete statistics on immigration are or most likely ever will be available since so many represent themselves as non-Russians.

The overseas immigration up to now has been mainly of the young and the physically strong. A large group went to Belgium to work as coal miners, another to Morocco to build roads, while a

third went to Canada for lumber work. Immigration has up to now been mostly carried out through groups assembled to fill occupational quotas in different countries. But recently a few communities in this country have found that among the Soviet refugees in Germany there were individuals with professional and laboring skills they gladly would—and now did—sponsor for immigration to the United States under the DP Bill. Gradually a trickle of Soviet DPs is, therefore, reaching different parts of the country.

On the social composition of the new Soviet emigration no statistics are available either. It is generally held, however, that most of it is from less skilled, laboring occupational groups. This marks another difference from the post-1917 "White" emigration, in which the intelligentsia and the widely educated upper strata were well represented.

It is interesting to note that of the Soviet émigré intellectuals the largest single group seems to be that of the non-party, largely Soviet-trained technical specialists. A contributing factor undoubtedly is that even technically-trained émigrés who rose to higher administrative and Communist Party offices today do not generally admit their higher position and merely refer to their original technical skill. This is done for reasons of both personal safety from Soviet persecution and for future employment, which is easier in technical fields.

The intelligentsia in the Soviet emigration comes mainly from three sources:

1. technical and administrative experts with officers' commissions in the Red Army;
2. the several dozen Soviet academic institutions, mainly from Leningrad, which were evacuated during the early part of the war, largely to the Caucasus, and fell into German hands;
3. German-occupied areas of the U.S.S.R., particularly the Ukraine.

II

Why did so many thousands of Soviet citizens prefer not to return to their native land after World War II?

My impression is that the decisive impetus was the harsh treatment meted out by their government to Soviet PWs and forced laborers returning to Russia after German internment.

Most Soviet émigrés, when questioned on this, cite the stories

about the Soviet prisoners taken during the Russo-Finnish war in 1940-41. Upon repatriation after the war to their native land, almost none reportedly returned to their homes, most of them being exiled and the officers executed. Reports were also current of Soviet treatment of liberated forced laborers and PWs as traitors during World War II. These reports were frequently substantiated by Soviet Russians who had gone through part or all of the repatriation process, and then fled to the Western Zones of Germany.

Already at the height of World War II, the treatment of Allied personnel freed from German internment was one of the most disputed points. I witnessed this personally at close range during twelve months' service at an American bomber base in Russia in 1944-45. The disputes were current both on the high policy level and on our lower level at Poltava. Here American PWs were brought from the Soviet front lines for return home after their liberation. At that time, Soviet officials working with us repeatedly asserted that each of their soldiers taken prisoner was highly suspect for either having surrendered voluntarily or for having been indoctrinated by Nazi and anti-Soviet ideology.

The Soviet policy, therefore, was apparently to isolate the Soviet ex-PWs in barbed wired enclosures and prisons, and consider them guilty "until proven otherwise." Our Soviet fellow-officers could not understand and bitterly objected to our welcome of liberated American PWs as loyal and devoted combat men. These were given a sumptuous bath, meal and rest before being transported in maximum comfort and without confinement to the United States. There they would undergo a routine investigation and then—a furlough or demobilization. It is noteworthy that perhaps more than any other single issue at the Poltava "shuttle-bombing" base, the policy and practical divergencies regarding treatment of liberated Allied PWs led to sharp disagreements, curt measures, and mutual suspicion between U. S. and Soviet officers.

Many Soviet émigrés will admit that it is definitely this fear of automatic exile upon return to the U.S.S.R. that led to the decision to stay away, rather than any ideological or materialistic considerations. There are, of course, exceptions. But it appears to me that in most cases the other factors, *i.e.* basic anti-Soviet sentiments and admiration for the Western "way of life," became crystallized and decisive only later.

Indirectly another factor contributed to the decision of many "non-returners." That was the starvation policy of Germany to-

ward Soviet prisoners of war. Not protected by the International Red Cross convention on prisoners of war, Soviet soldiers in enemy hands did not get the same, more or less regularized, decent treatment that Germany bestowed upon prisoners from the Western powers. When, in the early part of World War II, Soviet PWs were asked to join anti-Soviet ventures in Germany, many did so as a means to escape maltreatment and probably death. This decision to join an anti-Soviet movement, often forced by German cruelties towards prisoners, therefore, made return to their homeland well nigh impossible to many.

Chief among the war-time anti-Soviet movements under German patronage were the "Vlasovites." The profound veneration which the new Soviet emigration is bestowing upon Vlasov is in striking contrast with the little that has been published on him in the United States. Besides Eve Curie's war-time description in *Journey Among Warriors*, he was the subject of a controversy between Frederick L. Schuman, in *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad*, and David J. Dallin, in *The Real Soviet Russia*. Eugene Lyons attempted a sympathetic interpretation in the *American Mercury* of February, 1948. The first extensive study is appearing at present serially in the New York Russian-language *Novy Zhurnal* (New Review). The author of the study is B. I. Nicolaevski, a Russian émigré journalist and historian.

"Vlasovites" can be defined as the members of two affiliated anti-Soviet organizations set up in Germany during World War II: the Russian Liberation Movement and the Russian Liberation Army. Both of these groups were headed by ex-Red Army Lieutenant General Andrei A. Vlasov.

As a Red Army commander, Vlasov had distinguished himself greatly in the defense of Moscow in 1941. Eve Curie, who interviewed him in the Russian front lines at the time, in her book, *Journey Among Warriors*, portrays an ardent Communist and a strongly anti-German worshipper of Stalin's leadership. In 1942, Vlasov was taken prisoner by the advancing German army. His subsequent metamorphosis into the symbol and leader of the anti-Soviet movement in Hitler Germany has not been explained satisfactorily.

In many respects one is tempted to make an analogy with the Bolshevik "defeatism" in World War I. For both Lenin and Vlasov the basic rationale was the hope to defeat first what each considered to be the worst and strongest enemy. And in both cases this was

attempted with considerable disregard of the means. The Tsarist régime was the enemy which the Bolsheviks wanted to defeat at all costs. Thirty years later, Stalinism was the arch-enemy which the Vlasov movement was out to defeat. In each instance it was felt that this had to be done with the aid of an outside attack, since only military defeat would make an overthrow of the existing régime by the Russian population possible.

There is still insufficient first-hand evidence to pass judgement on just how close and full-hearted the cooperation between the Vlasov movement and Nazi Germany was. Surviving leaders of the movement assert it was never either completely trusted by the Nazi leadership or fully imbued by its ideology. Rather, they say, the Vlasov movement was premised on the Russian nationalistic democratism of its "Prague Manifesto" and was made possible only through the backing of certain non-Nazi circles of the Reichswehr. Critics, however, such as the New York Russian-language *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik* (Socialist Courier), charge it with a morally untenable position: fighting with Hitler to defeat Stalin. In particular the critics point to war-time utterances of Vlasov's officials to prove its toleration of anti-semitism.

A basic assumption of the Vlasov movement, ironically enough, was one which both Soviet and Nazi ideologists had often propagated. It was the assumption that a clash between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies would inevitably follow World War II if Hitler Germany was defeated. In such a development, the Vlasovites felt sure, the Western powers would welcome them as valuable partners.

The Vlasov movement claimed a total membership of some 300,000. Its army consisted at the very peak of only one combat division, another division in the process of activation, and a third one about to be activated. The short-lived "Russian Liberation Army," known as "ROA," was in existence from the end of 1944 to VE Day in May, 1945. Vlasov had apparently been promised the arming of a far larger contingent of volunteers from among Soviet prisoners, and the subordination to him of all existing Russian-manned units of the German army. Neither promise was kept. The "Balkan Korpus" and the infamous "S. S. Battalione" remained split among German commands, although it is possible that these at times were designated by others or themselves as "Vlasov Troops."

Supposedly autonomous from the Reichswehr, the Gestapo, and the S. S. troops, Vlasov's army reportedly participated in only one

major military action. This was at the very end of the war, on the Russian front. At that time the Vlasovites refused to give up their operational autonomy, as demanded. Thereupon, they left the front on their own. This they did just in time to play a bizarre key rôle in the liberation of Prague, as described, at the time, by Ivan H. Peterman in the *Saturday Evening Post* of July 14, 1945.

Together with several other Red Army generals who fought with him on the German side, Vlasov was hanged in Moscow in August, 1945. With his army rapidly disintegrating with Germany's collapse, the American Army had turned him over to the Red Army.

Besides the light it possibly throws on the stability of the Soviet régime, the Vlasov movement may go down in history as being most interesting because it brought together and deeply inspired the most aggressively anti-Stalin elements among the Soviet prisoners. Among them were numerous Communists and Red Army officers, including colonels and generals. The intellectual wing of the Vlasov movement, its ideologists, at present seem to have assumed the lead in many of the material and ideological dilemmas which bedevil the new Soviet emigration. Thousands of Russian émigrés today well-nigh worship Vlasov's memory as the great anti-Stalin symbol and martyr of the Russian people.

III

As so many political emigrations throughout history, the Soviet exiles are today in the midst of as yet embryonic organizational and ideological controversies. Both living hardships and uncertainty about values are so great at present, that to speak of definite orientations and movements is still most difficult.

Three trends may be definitely recorded. One is the readiness with which Soviet émigrés have fraternized with the old "White" Russian émigrés, at least in Germany. There are, of course, differences, very basic ones, in education, in morals, in perspective. But the disdain and suspicion that one may have expected of a Soviet-schooled generation seems to be largely absent.

Another marked trend among the Soviet émigrés is a probably predominant turning to both Greek Orthodox religious practices and an active Russian nationalism.

Lastly, an aversion to even the term "socialism," which to them implies Soviet-like government predominance, is combined with a conviction that when and if Sovietism is removed, Russia need not

and should not return to the political and economic system which prevailed before the first Russian Revolution in 1917.

In the field of political organizations, Soviet émigrés have so far shown little sympathy for the active pro-Tsarist "Supreme Monarchist Council."

This is not to say, however, that the new Russian émigrés are politically in unanimous agreement. Several orientations are today bidding for the support of the Soviet emigration centered in Western Germany, with much passion and animosity generated in each quarter.

One of these groups is NTS (*Natsionalno-Trudovoi Soyuz*). Its main strength is reportedly in the British zone, while in the U. S. Zone of Germany it is represented by a leading émigré newspaper, *Ekho*. NTS originated in the 1930's, among the younger second generation of "White" Russian émigrés, mainly in the Balkans.

The program of NTS, as one of its leaders, C. W. Boldyrev, stated in *Look* magazine of October 26, 1948, is summarized by the philosophy of the "solidarist state." Although its quite lengthy post-war program makes frequent references to democracy, NTS and its "solidarism" continue to bear a striking resemblance to Mussolini's corporate state. Great stress is laid on a select leadership and on the integration of all national life without any political parties.

As does NTS, several other groups claim to have inherited Vlasov's mantle. With their strength centered in Bavaria, these groups were founded and are led by ex-Soviet intellectuals in their 30's and 40's who were active as secondary leaders in the war-time Vlasov movement. The program, as evolved in the magazines *Borba* (Struggle) and *Za Rodinu* (For the Motherland), is generally democratic and libertarian and calls for a popular anti-Stalin revolution within Russia. The most active of these neo-Vlasovite groups are SBONR (Fighting Union for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia) and the war veterans' SAF (Union of the Flag of St. Andrew).

Among the newer political groupings of the Soviet émigrés is the "Democratic Union of the Peoples of Russia." Its outlook appears to be closest to the democratic Left of the post-1917 Russian emigration.

Alongside these groups, there is a considerable disaffection from all things political which reminds one of present-day German youth.

In evidence also is an anti-Stalinism, which often has few positive ideas to supplement it. Besides an intense elemental craving for

personal liberty, common to all, this *Weltanschauung* frequently boils down to ideological primitivism. Many ex-Soviet Russians thus would fight the present Soviet system with the same terror and immorality of which it is so bitterly accused by them.

Soviet émigrés, living in great misery, isolated in language and intellectual facilities, have had little stimulus, leisure, or perspective to make a complete ideological re-valuation. Only a far more favorable environment and more outside contacts can fashion a positive substitute for discarded beliefs and morals.

A first step toward greater outside contact, it should be noted, was taken this summer when the Munich Russian Library was established in a partially bombed-out building at Ismaningerstrasse 75. A cooperative venture, the Munich Russian Library aims at expanding the two-way exchange of ideas and factual data between the new Soviet emigration and Western countries.

What are the views of the Soviet emigration on the U.S.S.R.? Perhaps the most frequent statement of the Soviet émigrés I have talked to has been that there is very widespread and thorough disaffection in every layer of the population against the Soviet government. It is only the ever-present and ever-feared system of arrests that precludes open manifestations of this supposedly almost general discontent.

This discontent, the Soviet exiles feel, centers on the excessive police and administrative control of day-to-day life, executed heartlessly in the interest of a small top group. A most frequent additional comment is about the increasingly meaningless standardization of Communist ideology. Its hackneyed clichés are mouthed by all to protect themselves, but the slogans have little if any of the inspiration and standing of past years, even among most Communist Party members.

Most Soviet émigrés, all of whom were in the U.S.S.R. at the outbreak of World War II, believed that it was very likely to lose the war against Germany in the early stages, due to great popular disaffection. Only dastardly German atrocities in Soviet areas held by them aroused an anger and patriotism in the average Russian which made victory possible.

Taking issue with what they consider American naiveté and wishful thinking, Soviet exiles seem to be deeply certain that military conflict between the U.S.S.R. and the West before long is unavoidable. They feel the Soviet government has committed itself to such a conflict through its extreme, expansionist stand in international

affairs since World War II, and its unwillingness to relax its extreme dogmas and domestic controls. Even during the recent war against Germany, they state, Soviet officials continued the most outspoken and intransigent anti-Western indoctrination of Red Army troops and government personnel.

IV

World War II has brought with it a great increase in the general interest in the Soviet Union. Russian studies in America have particularly expanded in the past few years. The Russian Institute at Columbia University, the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, and the Russian Program of the American Council of Learned Societies testify well to that.

One obstacle, however, has frustrated foreign students of Soviet Russia. That is the difficulty, if not impossibility, of obtaining systematic insight into its basic trends and its day-to-day functioning. Travel inside Russia has been difficult before World War II and almost entirely restricted since its outbreak. Native descriptive and interpretative material outside of the official governmental publications is not available. Even scholarly and general works published in the U.S.S.R. are often difficult for American experts to procure.

Particularly because of this lack of extensive "primary" evidence on Soviet society, the potential value of the Soviet émigrés to the West is so great. Here, for the first time, a source of information has become available which can throw light on the workings of Soviet life—a life which has never really been fully accessible to a foreign observer, no matter how hard he tried. Unlike past experiences within Russia, a new émigré has neither the native's unnerving apprehension of contact with outsiders, nor the foreigners' partial and too often superficial knowledge, rapport, and insight.

The new Soviet emigration thus could, I believe, provide much previously unobtainable insight into basic questions on Soviet society which have so preoccupied and often stumped American experts as well as the average person: How has Soviet schooling shaped the individual? How does the Communist Party function as a governing group? What is the machinery and efficacy of Soviet economic and over-all planning? What is the military and industrial potential of the U.S.S.R.?

These Russian exiles of recent vintage can be so valuable because

they represent a striking cross-section of the Soviet population, its professional and geographical distribution. There are thousands of *kolkhoznik*-peasants and factory workers. Some of them are from the great industrial centers of Russia, others from the outlying national districts whose development under the Soviet system has been of such great interest to the outside world. One can find numerous Communist Party functionaries, directors of large factories and economic agencies, managers of collective farms. Many had been higher officers and political functionaries in the Red Army. There is among them a sizable sprinkling of former Soviet engineers, scientists, teachers, and government officials.

Here lies the great difference between the individual Soviet Russians who became widely-known exiles—the Kasenkinas, Kravchenkos, Barmines, and Krivitskys—and this large mass of post-war Soviet émigrés: the latter's far greater number and representativeness. Whereas the experience of one may well have been atypical, the availability of a much larger sample now makes interpretations and conclusions far more plausible and scientific.

On a more personal and immediate level, contact with the Soviet émigrés can be a most revealing experience. When I recently visited Munich in the American zone of Germany, for instance, I spoke to innumerable Soviet DPs. It was fascinating to hear factory managers and engineers picture Soviet planning and industrialization from their own work. I met ex-Red Army officers who described the Russo-Finnish war and World War II, as they experienced them personally, including the impression foreign countries made on Soviet troops. I spoke to several former Communist Party officials and regular army officers who had been "purged" in the 1930s and then released before the war. I also talked to the Dean of a Moscow Graduate School of Architecture, who had also been Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Architecture, to a well-known Leningrad professor-scientist, to a Kiev professor of history. I got acquainted with *kolkhozniks*, Red Army men, student-Komsomols.

Some problems connected with "pumping" Soviet émigrés are largely technical. Many of the exiles, for instance, have only a smattering of German, and few know English. So far they lack periodicals, current Soviet publications, and foreign studies on the U.S.S.R. to keep generally up-to-date or to do systematic research on Russia.

Unfamiliar with either the English language or American ways or thought, individual Soviet exiles can probably be "exploited" only

by a group which includes people thoroughly versed in Soviet lingo and Soviet history. Only that way can rapport be established and slangy or unprecise testimony appreciated and pinned down. In many instances exiles, still fearful of Soviet persecution, disguise their identity and past occupation to all except trusted fellow-exiles. Only to people thoroughly vouched for by these will any one admit his Communist Party membership or his high post as a director of an industrial concern, a secret police official, or a district secretary of the Communist Party.

Most basic, of course, is the value judgment on the testimonies. This is true even if others confirm a tone of surprising moderation on the part of many Soviet émigrés, when discussing the U.S.S.R., which struck me greatly this summer. Their present predicament is still apt to color the remembrance of past personal experiences, and essential on the part of American analysts will be an unwillingness to accept too readily whatever anti-Soviet evidence some may expect or hope to hear.

One will find Soviet émigrés with the pathological extremeness which often comes with disillusionment, uncertainty, bitterness about one's own life and the fate of friends. Furthermore, the decision of many a Soviet émigré to fight with Hitler against his own government—and therefore also against the Western democracies, even if only indirectly—must create a driving pressure to justify that step through excessive blackening of Sovietism.

Allowing for these extremes, most difficult, in making fullest scientific use of the knowledge of the new Soviet emigration, is thus the evaluation and "weighting" of individual testimony. This is a general problem of scholars in deciding just how representative a testimony is, how reliable, precise, and valuable it is, and how much "control" and substantiation from official records and other testimonies is available, feasible, and desirable.

In addition to the value of the Soviet emigration in itself as a primary source of information, there are, however, two factors which should reduce and compensate for the problem's complexity: extensive past experience of American scholars and social scientists in making use of testimony of uncertain reliability, and the frequently no less great uncertainty as to official Soviet data.

Today the "Russian Question" has forcefully come to the fore in the news of the day. Aside, however, from relief aid by the International Rescue and Relief Committee and the Tolstoy Foundation so far little has been done in the United States regarding the post-

war Soviet émigrés. Confirming this situation, Joseph and Stuart Alsop reported in the *New York Herald Tribune* of October 31, 1948, that the creation of an "Institute of Russian Studies" has been proposed at a high level in the U. S. State Department. The staff of this Institute would be "carefully selected from the tens of thousands who have escaped from the Soviet Union."

The direct and indirect limitations to the study of contemporary Russia, and the resulting oversimplifications and misconceptions in the United States, make the new Soviet emigration most valuable as a truly first-hand, "inside," source of information.

Belinsky—Advocate of Liberty

By H. HANDLEY CLOUTIER

I

SINCE Belinsky's death, the centennial of which was commemorated last year, widespread discussion has arisen with respect to the erratic and ebullient nature of his character and the frequency with which he altered his professed views on both art and society. Pypin spoke of him as a "most ardent partisan of new ideas and, doubtless, a very active proclaimer and defender of them."¹ Various reasons might be advanced as to the basis of Belinsky's variable and ardent intellectual activities. Some of these reasons are obvious, others less so and even questionable, but I shall not touch upon them. For whatever the motivation may have been, Belinsky certainly did not receive the soubriquet of "impetuous Vissarion" without considerable justification.

Interest in Belinsky is not confined, however, to the psychologist or even to the student of literary criticism. For Belinsky, owing to his demonstrative character and the aberrations which may be found in his writings, has left behind him a legacy of polemical efforts to define precisely the nature of his beliefs.

It is true that his opinions were much contested during his lifetime and that he remained a figure of constant controversy after his death. By far the major part of the discussion has concerned his attitude towards the place of art in society and it is even possible that his importance in this respect has been exaggerated and it is certain that his views have been interpreted with a strong bias at certain times.

Not until the end of the last century did Belinsky's rôle as a social thinker receive serious attention, and only in the last thirty years has there been open discussion of his social significance. It is possible, of course, that the existence of the censorship had something to do with the negligent attention paid to the political overtones of his writings. It is far more likely that the intelligentsia of the latter decades of the nineteenth century were not fully aware of their own antecedents. At the present time it is recognized generally that the

¹A. Pypin, *Kharakteristiki Literaturnykh Mnenii ot 20-ykh do 50-ykh Godov*, St. Petersburg, 1890, p. 425.

influence of Herzen on the subsequent intellectual development of Russia was considerable. The same may be said of Belinsky. However, those generations most affected by these men and by the thoughts they expressed were relatively unaware of the sources of inspiration thus accorded.

II

The Russian intelligentsia under Nicholas I laboured under the realization that, whatever trends of thought might be developed, there existed no possibility of their application to contemporary problems of Russian society. All intellectual activity was perforce confined to the arena of theory alone. At the same time, the third and fourth decades of the century marked the inauguration of the intelligentsia itself as a continuing group which concerned itself with intellectual matters but which could boast of no previous tradition or antecedents and had therefore to develop for the first time a relationship to Russian society and to the State. Thus, for a dual reason, which reflected not only the immediate novelty of the intelligentsia, but also the latter's enforced isolation from current matters of national interest, attention was drawn to Western Europe.

Russia, which had no inheritance of the Renaissance and Reformation upon which to draw for its traditions of culture and which had witnessed no concerted attempt to unseat the feudal aristocracy and the Church, did not have the occasion to evolve the intellectual development which accompanied social and political development in Western Europe. Aside from possessing a modest acquaintance with contemporary Western literature, Russia, in the mid-eighteenth century, stood at the intellectual level at which Europe had been during the Thirty Years' War. However, in the reign of Catherine, the principles of the French Enlightenment attracted Russian attention and interest in European intellectualism began in earnest. Heretofore the material status of the nation had been matched by intellectual backwardness, then suddenly thought was advanced by a century or more while society stood still. In the Western campaign of 1813 and 1814, many young Russians observed at first hand the social progress made by the West and the latent trend of radicalism received strong sustenance in the sentiments personified by Griboedov's Chatsky.

There existed in Russia no political or cultural tradition of a rising bourgeoisie, either as a progressive force for human liberty or as an initiator of the socialistic class struggle. Consequently, the Decem-

brists, composed in the main of aristocratic elements, found themselves endorsing the anti-aristocratic, pro-bourgeois aims of the French Revolution, and, as time went on, an intelligentsia drawn from the ranks of the aristocracy and the petty officialdom became the advocates of socialism and even anarchism. It is little wonder that the broad gap between the social and the intellectual development of Russian society produced such volcanic tempers and virile imaginations as those of Bakunin and Belinsky.

As the bourgeoisie of Europe became less a force of progress and more one of reaction, the Russians, who had been attracted by the slogans of liberalism but who had no interest in the capitalization of economies or the exploitation of labor, turned to escapism in the form of Schellingsque romanticism and Fichtean idealism. As liberalism fell further into disfavor, Utopian Socialism absorbed a larger portion of attention. Simultaneously, the nascent Slavophile movement drew attention to the possibilities of socialization of the peasant economy on the basis of the peasant commune, and stated that the foundation of Slavic life is not a state but a common *mir* or communal social institution in which personality remains independent as does a separate voice in a choir. This idea was a direct product of Russia's material status at the time and had been evidenced in Europe in an earlier century. There could be no reconciliation between the Slavophiles with such ideas, so intellectually anachronistic in comparison with contemporary Europe, and the Westerners with their interest in modern Utopian Socialism and liberalism, so the two groups rapidly diverged because of this temporal disparity.

The Utopian suggestion of progress from on high, of evolution on the initiative of the upper classes, was popular in Russia where there were as yet no lower classes in the new meaning of the phrase and no prospect of the creation of either a bourgeoisie or a proletariat in the foreseeable future. Also of comfort to those who keenly felt the retarded state of Russian development was the novel dialectical concept of Hegel that new improvements will always proceed from any former impasse and that nothing becomes bad, it only becomes old and outdated. As it became ever more apparent that there could be no political or social changes in the Russia of Nicholas I, the intelligentsia turned more and more to a study of philosophy and a contemplation of the world of the spirit. Nothing could have fitted Russian needs more suitably than the Fichtean ideal of internal harmony and the admonition for each individual to strive for his own

perfection for "if all men are perfect then the need for political societies is obviated and man has indeed achieved Utopia." Divergent though these concepts may seem, they each satisfied a peculiarity of the Russian intellectual milieu of the time and were unified by their aptness in that milieu.

In the thirties the program of St. Simon found voice in the circle of Herzen and Ogarev and, in the next decade, that of Fourier was proclaimed by the circle of Petrashevsky. Yet these doctrines were organically French in origin and were adapted to the current French phenomena of turgescient bourgeois conservatism and evanescent personal liberty. The Russians were far removed mentally, as well as physically, from the French political scene and consequently the various adventures in St. Simonism and Fourierism were not the strenuous strivings of a militant faith but rather the manifestations of continuing intellectual exercise. For what had interested the majority of the intelligentsia had been the overtones of individual freedom which could be found in Utopian Socialism and not the socialist principles of individual subordination. The nature of this interest was revealed by the avidity with which the novels of Georges Sand were seized upon in order that the authoress' attitude of commiseration for the insulted and injured might be absorbed.

Another aspect of French thought that found wide currency in Russia at the time was the typical cynicism with which the miscarriage of the Revolution was viewed during the thirties. Cynicism was bound to rear its head amongst the Russian intelligentsia which possessed all the progressive sentiments of the French bourgeoisie of 1789 and yet was forced to choose between the retrogressive anti-egalitarian program of the contemporary bourgeoisie on the one hand and the retrogressive anti-liberal program of the Utopian Socialists on the other.

Through the confusion of politics from France and philosophy from Germany, the intelligentsia abandoned the Hegelian principle of acceptance of reality and resolved to combat the situation in Russia which was in their eyes utterly deplorable. Their methods were undefined, and their aims, which they kept always before them, were to abolish serfdom in Russia, to insure the ability for political and social development, and to assure to each individual the benefits of individual freedom before the law and before God. Although Belinsky's adherence to these ideals may have been only subconscious at times, they were the essential tenets to which, despite seeming contradictions, he held fast throughout his life and which he so eloquently proclaimed.

III

As a child, Belinsky was greatly affected by the boorish qualities of his father's ne'er-do-well companions, as well as by the fraudulent treatment accorded the serfs by the gentry, the corruption amongst the petty officials, and the banal commonalty of life in Chembar which remained in his memory always. He was particularly incensed by the recollection of the affronts to personal dignity which the serfs suffered at the hands of the gentry, and his youthful experience generated in his adult life a profound hatred for all negations of human dignity. These memories, coupled with an overweening romanticism borrowed from Schiller, were revealed in *Dmitri Kalinin*. Belinsky wrote to his father that the latter "would recognize many persons well known to him" in the drama, but that he hoped his father would not take umbrage without reading the play.² In the work, Belinsky wrote of serfdom in the following fashion:

Who has rendered this murderous right that some may enslave by their own power the will of others, and by such means rob these latter of their blessed right of freedom? Who has permitted them to abuse the rights of nature and of humanity? The seigneur may, for amusement or diversion, flay the skin from his slaves, can sell them as though they were cattle, barter them for a hound or a cow, separate them for life from their fathers and mothers and from all that is dear and precious to them.³

Belinsky was not yet aware of the full political and social implications of serfdom and was naively depressed by the horror and retribution which followed the circulation of his drama. Convinced that liberal thoughts could be expressed only in a sympathetic and fraternal atmosphere, he became a participant in the circle of Stankevich, where he shared his opinions with others of similar leanings and where he gradually broadened his concepts. One idea that struck him with particular force was the thought that art could perform a useful function in society. He also became acquainted with the pantheism and romanticism of Schelling and sought to establish in thought and reason all the fine, aesthetic sensations of man. He was beginning to correlate literature with philosophy.

He undertook to write an historical review of Russian literature under the title of *Literary Reflections*, in which he opined, under influence of Schellingsesque idealism, that Russia as yet possessed no literature in any real sense and that the gap between the intelligentsia and the masses must be closed before a proper literary

²Belinsky, *Pisma*, St. Petersburg, 1914, v. I, p. 28.

³N. L. Brodsky, *V. G. Belinsky*, Moscow, 1946, pp. 14-15.

tradition could be created. The Government, said he, although a vehicle for progress, failed to take into account the paramount interests of the individual over those of the general society. He welcomed the efforts of Zhukovsky and the youthful Pushkin and felt that: "In Russian literature there approaches the transcendency from artistic slavery and constraint, under which it has been hitherto impossible to breathe freely, to naturalism and nationalism."⁴ Such a transcendency, he pointed out later, was culminated in the works of Gogol and Koltsov.

The activities of Stankevich and his associates were confined to a study of philosophy in order to establish a "strict understanding of the human mission." The realm of political theory interested them not at all. Long an enemy of serfdom, of coarseness and hypocrisy, and of the privileged gentry, whose gradual dissolution he foresaw as a result of the absence of the right of entail, Belinsky had no defined political opinion. His interest was chiefly moral and enabled him to embrace conservatism with a clear conscience, since he saw in it the best methods of achieving his personal moral ideals. However, the conservatism which he espoused was the type which stood for evolutionary progress, such as envisioned by Pushkin, and not the chauvinism personified by Griboedov's Famusov.

As yet, he had developed no firm knowledge of the questions of social life and he was able to form friendships with such men as Bakunin because of similar philosophical interests. He was impressed with Bakunin's rendition of Fichtean idealism and in a visit to Pryamukhino, the country home of the Bakunins, he found himself thoroughly enchanted with the soothing possibilities of Fichtean internal harmony. Yet Fichte's philosophy, in which Bakunin saw the incarnation of Kantian subjective idealism, caused Belinsky to note that he "understood Fichteism to be Robespierreism and smelled in the new theory the scent of blood."⁵ He realized, even in the course of his retreat into Fichtean idealism, that for him the life of the ideal would always distinguish itself in his conceptions from the life of the real, but he also perceived in later years the extreme value which accrued to him because of this interlude:

I recognize and appreciate the necessity of this period and the great service which it afforded me. My present confidence in myself and all that is of worth to me I owe to this period and without it I should have developed nothing of value.⁶

⁴A. N. Pypin, *Belinsky, Zhizn i Perepiska*, St. Petersburg, 1909, p. 81.

⁵I. Kubikov, *Belinsky, Zhizn i Literaturnaya Deyatel'nost*, Moscow, 1924, p. 22.

⁶Pypin, *Belinsky*, p. 149.

By 1837, he had developed sufficient interest in political affairs to write that the adoption of a constitution in Russia would be her ruination and that enlightenment not political reform was the first task. The subconscious concern, intensified in later years by his observances in Germany, that an untutored electorate could do itself more harm than good by immediate suffrage, can be discerned in Belinsky's thought at the time. To him, civic liberty represented a compendium of the liberties of individual freemen, and he felt men would become free only through knowledge and a sense of responsibility. Politics, like wine, would be suitable for adults, but not for Russians. Russia's salvation lay in education, not in revolution or constitutions:

Not in mysticism, not in asceticism, not in pietism, but in the successes of civilization, enlightenment, and humanity. She does not need sermons (she has heard enough of them!) nor prayers (she has intoned enough of them!), but the awakening in the populace of a feeling of human worthiness, lost for so many centuries in dirt and filth, of truth, and of law practiced not in conformity with the Church dogma, but in conformity with sound thought and justice and of the fulfillment of these laws to the highest degree.⁷

Russia, which was deprived of the scientific, artistic, and religious sources of French political progress, could not be expected, in Belinsky's opinion, to absorb European political knowledge. The need was for apostles not of revolution but of enlightenment. And so, "we must study, study, and still study even more. To hell with politics, we must grasp the lamp of learning."⁸

Not unlike the contemporary Utopian Socialists of the West, Belinsky, having decided that civic rights could stem only from human rights, concerned himself with a philosophical quest for a proper definition of the latter. In his letter of September 8, 1841, Belinsky says:

Sociality,⁹ sociality,—or death! there is my standard!—what is it to me that the whole survives, if the particular and the individual suffers? What does it matter if the earthly genius dwells in the heavens, when the populace wallows

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 532.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 155.

⁹In the original, *sotsialnost*, which is not listed in Ushakov, *Tolkovy Slovar Russkogo Yazyka*, Moscow, 1940. Belinsky obviously did not intend to convey the meaning of *sotsializm* by the use of this word, but rather the meaning of *obshchestvennost*, which is equivalent to the English *consociation*. To impute to Belinsky a predilection towards socialism on the basis of this phrase as the Marxists have done is to disregard completely the entire remaining text of the letter. Cf. Belinsky, *Pisma*, cited, v. II, pp. 261-271.

in the mud? Take all blessings from me if they are accorded to me alone amongst thousands. I wish nothing which is not shared by my lesser brothers. My heart drips blood and spasmodically shudders at the sight of the crowd and its representatives. And this society, existing on a basis of reason, is the appearance of reality! I am bitter against all substantive bases which claim a faith in the human will!

There will come a time when there will be no rich, no poor, no kings or subjects, but only brothers, people. In the words of the apostle Paul, Christ's power will be given to the Father Almighty and the Father—Reason Incarnate—shall reign in a new Heaven and over a new world.

It is difficult to look upon the contents of the above passages and see in them the expression of the principles of "scientific" Marxist socialism.

He began to be more concerned with reality when he found that Fichte could satisfy him no longer. His gloomy pessimism was the precise state of mind for which the Hegelian system had been engendered and Belinsky grasped avidly at Bakunin's presentation of Hegel. To Belinsky, who scorned his tutor's unconsciousness of reality, Hegel seemed the perfect negation of Fichtean idealism. Reconciliation with reality eased his soul and the dialectic with its promise of progress gave him hope. In a letter to Botkin written in 1840, Belinsky stated:

I submit my abominable aspiration to a reconciliation with abominable reality. Behold the great Schiller, noble defender of humanity, bright star of salvation, emancipator of society from the bloody prejudice of the past! Behold reason, hidden in shadow!¹⁰

For a time, he toyed with materialism, which he came to regard as a monster, seizing and devouring those who refuse to surrender. Materialism, it appeared to Belinsky, is a great leveler and takes people from one extreme to the other;—he whose dreams have gone unrealized soon comes to believe that reality, and not the dream, is the object of his desires. In his understanding of materialism, he fell into a sort of fatalism and went so far as to say: "The will of God is the *predestination* of the East, the *fatum* of antiquity, the *foresight* of Christianity, the *necessity* of philosophy, and is, finally, *materialism*."¹¹

Belinsky saw that French philosophy in the eighteenth century had been based upon a divorce between the ego and the reality, and had culminated in revolution on the one hand and materialism on the

¹⁰Kubikov, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

¹¹Pypin, *Belinsky*, p. 201.

other. He also saw that a similar divorce had occurred in Russian thought and, in the hope of avoiding a cataclysmic issue, he recommended a reconciliation with reality, a working agreement between God and Chaos. By keeping always before him the question of the practical ramifications of philosophical thought, he avoided a relapse into the depths of abstract Hegelian orthodoxy.

By 1841, Belinsky felt so depressed that he began to lose faith in Hegel. Herzen told him of the discovery of Hegelianism as the "algebra of revolution" and Belinsky learned that the modish manner of protest against stagnant reality was through the medium of Utopian Socialism. At the end of the year he was at a new extreme: socialism, that "... idea of ideas . . . that life of lives . . . that question of questions . . . that alpha and omega of faith and knowledge . . . all is in it, for it, and towards it . . . it embodies history, religion, and philosophy."¹²

He called upon Hegel for an accounting of all the victims of history and of the conditions of life. He failed to see that the fatalism of Hegel was implicit in the new doctrine and that one day both systems would be combined into dialectical materialism, and the liberalism which was also implicit in the new doctrine would be discarded by Marxism. He also turned upon his former companions in idealism and told them that introspection as a means of salvation was false and egotistical and that "when a fire occurs, one must not flee from it, but run towards it in order to find, together with others, the collective means by which it may be extinguished."¹³ By 1844 he could read with approval Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law* and found the materialism of Feuerbach appealing.

His letter to Botkin of June, 1841, in which he professed to understand the French Revolution and the policies of Marat, contained the cynical observation: "I am beginning to approve of the humanity of Marat: in order to bring happiness to a small segment of humanity, I would destroy, it seems, the remainder by fire and the sword."¹⁴

There seems to be a whimsical quality to this statement when read in context and it was quickly refuted by a statement to the effect that Hegel was wrong to subordinate the individual man to the general good of society.

¹²P. N. Sakulin, *Russkaya Literatura i Sotsializm*, Moscow, 1924, Part I, p. 199; Belinsky, *Pisma*, cited, v. II, pp. 261-271.

¹³Kubikov, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

¹⁴M. Iovchuk, *Belinsky*, Moscow, 1939, p. 113.

The appearance of *Dead Souls* added to his impression that Gogol had drawn an articulate protest against Russian conditions in the time of Nicholas I, but the essential value which he found in both *Dead Souls* and *Revizor* was Gogol's idea that life should be founded on reasoned and intelligent bases. This thought had been expressed by Belinsky himself at an earlier date.¹⁵ He also was vitally interested in the first offerings of the new talent of Dostoevsky, whose attention seemed to focus on the mousy little people who moved almost unnoticed amidst the gala array of Petersburg society. It was these same little people who held Belinsky's heart.

Herzen's *Letters from the Other Shore* started a controversy over the question of the function of the bourgeoisie. Belinsky hoped that a bourgeois tradition would arise in Russia and he refused to countenance abolition of the middle class until it had been proven what history would make of that class in the future. Only three months before his death he was to write to Annenkov that no progress could come to Russia until the gentry had been transformed into a bourgeoisie with a cultural, political, and social tradition of its own.¹⁶ The life of the people, he wrote in his *Review of Russian Literature in 1846*, could not be punted about like a frail boat but must have careful and expert guidance. He was still concerned with the prospects facing the lower classes in their search for personal liberty and he looked upon Utopian Socialism as a sort of dialectical antithesis to the thesis of reality. These would emerge in final form with the positive aspects of each incorporated in the synthesis. His review of Eugene Sue's *Les Mystères de Paris* showed that his inclinations towards the fate of popular sovereignty were those of a cynic of the period and that his primary stand still identified him with the bourgeois liberalism of the French Revolution.

IV

It is not true to say, as some Marxist critics have said, that, because of the censorship, Belinsky was unable to give his views full circulation. Nowhere in his letters does there appear the attitude that Utopian Socialism was anything but a tool, the best at hand, yet actually imperfect, with which to champion the concepts of individualism. He could have found all the essential integers of Marxism in the works of Fourier, Proudhon, Feuerbach, or even of

¹⁵Belinsky, *Pisma*, v. II, p. 218.

¹⁶Belinsky, *Pisma*, v. III, pp. 335-340.

Marx himself, including communization of productive enterprises and the public ownership of the means of production. These he did not accept and he actually turned, in the last months of his life, from Utopian Socialism. It has been pointed out, with reason, that the socialism of the thirties and forties had nothing in common with real socialism, and that it was only "an ideological cloud of the bourgeois-democratic aspirations of the intelligentsia."¹⁷ It has been observed also that the

intelligentsia needed not equality or socialization of the means of production, but freedom, which was reflected subjectively in the freedom of bourgeois development and it appropriated the ideas of this freedom not in the discredited bourgeois liberalism but in the intellectual socialism of the Utopians, a socialism which appeared to be an attempt to reform and better the growing bourgeois society and to give it a serviceable place in the field of intellect, freed from its stupid traditions and prejudices.¹⁸

Belinsky hoped to advance liberalism by means of Utopianism and, like Herzen, he found that the core of the Utopian approach, the study of theoretical conditions rather than objective conditions, rendered it only partially effective. Thus his dissatisfaction with it was a double one. Not only did Utopian Socialism put too little emphasis on human liberty, but it voided possible progress by virtue of an incorrect and weak approach to the problems of society. His was no mystical faith in the people or their qualities; he had realized the instinctive conservatism of the masses much earlier and, while he was convinced of the inadequacies of reform from above without enlightenment below, he preferred such hopeful tactics to the obscurantism of the Slavophiles or the populism of Herzen. The latter wrote of him that he "opposed the Slavophile idolatries of the past with a lively sympathy for all which agitated contemporary man, a love of freedom of thought, and a hatred of all that limited it."¹⁹

Consequently, the "proofs," so-called, of Belinsky's socialist nature, are not proofs at all, but are the result of misplaced emphasis or of deliberate misinterpretation. His latter views in no wise were a fundamental contradiction of his earlier views. His was a belief in human freedom and in sociological realism. Wherever he could find a program which would augment these beliefs, he ac-

¹⁷G. Lelevich, "Byl-li Rannii Russky Sotsializm Sotsializmom," in *Pechat i Revolutsiya*, 1924, v. I, p. 15.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹⁹Sir John Maynard, *Russia in Flux*, London, 1941, p. 177.

cepted it conditionally. It is more important to note what portions he rejected of the Schellingesque, Fichtean, Hegelian, and Utopian doctrines than to be deceived in the idea that he accepted every doctrine in full. He saw that the future for the Russians lay in their own hands, that the fault was not in their stars but in themselves, that they were underlings, and that only hard work and devotion to the national interest would assure that future. Ideas might come from the West but these ideas must be adapted to Russian conditions and would not mean automatic regeneration. In his letter to Kavelin of November, 1847, Belinsky confessed that he had not yet found a program which was to his liking and that he was indecisive in regard to his future opinions.²⁰ In July he had written his most famous document, the *Letter to Gogol*.

In this "testament," Belinsky spoke of Russia as a land where there is no guarantee of individuality or honor, where the peasants do not wash themselves, because they believe the words of their masters who tell them they are not human beings, but animals. Despite a superstitious quality, the Russian folk is not possessed of mystic exaltation but is gifted with clarity and positiveness of mind and therein lies the enormous scope of its historic destinies in the future. The character of the Russian people is determined by the conditions of Russian society in which fresh forces are seething and straining to burst out, but, crushed by severe oppression, finding no escape, induce only despondence, ennui, and apathy. Only in literature alone is there still life and progress; the instinct for truth lies deep within the Russian, although that instinct is not yet developed. The resignation preached by Gogol smacks of fearful pride and of a most disgraceful debasement of human dignity. The idea of becoming some sort of abstract paragon, of rising superior to all men through resignation, can only be the fruit either of pride or of feeble-mindedness, and, in both instances, inevitably leads to hypocrisy, sanctimoniousness, and celestial quietism. To express cynical and nasty opinions is downright vile and arouses not only indignation but contempt. Gogol was merely groping in the dark, without enlightenment, and had grasped neither the form nor the spirit of Russia. He had expressed not the truth of Christianity's teaching, but a sickly fear of death, of the Devil, and of Hell.

Much of what Belinsky had to say about Gogol arose from a lack of comprehension with regard to the novelist's motives. Yet the

²⁰Belinsky, *Pisma*, cited, v. III, pp. 297-303.

Letter to Gogol is remembered not for its negative criticism of Gogol but for the positive statements which are made by Belinsky. He took three days to compose the *Letter*, but its contents were the product of a lifetime.

V

Belinsky's memory has become surrounded by an aura of pug-nacity and legend. It has been his fate to have been recalled, at different periods, in one of three characterizations. The critics, Chernyshevsky, Dobrolubov, and Pisarev, enthroned him as the initiator of "social art" and radically altered his own theories, which were that good art may serve social ends, and presented him as a firm believer in the doctrine that all art, good or bad, is justified if it serves social ends. This translated doctrine is being eulogized today in the Soviet Union.

The classical Marxists, particularly Plekhanov, and other critics whose work appeared in the decade immediately following the Revolution of 1917, presented Belinsky as one of the originators of Russian socialism in the rôle of an Utopian Socialist. They felt that it was probable that, by dialectical processes, his views would have developed into those of a Marxian socialist.

In recent years, Soviet critics have come to revere Belinsky as a "revolutionary democrat" and a "philosophical materialist." They chide him gently for failing to amplify his brief statements to the effect that "man, with all his qualities, is only a product of social relations" and that "man is created by nature and developed and defined by society." It is regrettable from their point of view that the great critic "never quite reached dialectical materialism" nor envisioned the masses as material "to be moulded into a tool with which to destroy bourgeois capitalism." He saw the proletariat only as a suffering class, not as "the means to destroy the old order and create the socialist state." The Soviets honor him because in their opinion, he attempted in 1844-45 to formulate the doctrine that "the material and spiritual needs of mankind are the only motive force of social development; these needs are actual, not theoretical; if a man hungers, fornicates, or shivers, it is only because he is an animal."²¹ As these modernists see it, Belinsky was denied by circumstances an insight into dialectical materialism but possessed all the separate traits of a militant Marxian socialist.

The opinion of the classical Marxists that Belinsky contributed to the spread of Utopian Socialism in Russia is a valid one. He con-

²¹Iovchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

tributed, as did others, to the growth of not only Utopian Socialism, but of Hegelianism, Fichteism, romanticism, and idealism, for he gave publicity to these programs and brought them to the notice of the reading public. To deny this contribution is to deny the many genital sources of socialism in Russia. But it does not follow that Belinsky himself was the child, or father, of any one of these doctrines, including Utopian Socialism. The present Soviet view is simply an extension of the classical Marxist position carried to its extremity.

These, then, are the terms which have been accorded in somewhat of an *ave-atque-vale* fashion to Belinsky's memory. He himself wrote to his father in the early thirties that

The end justifies the means, so say the learned men. Only after the actor has played his rôle to the end will there be applause or hissing; only after a man has finished his entire career is it possible to judge him.²²

The Marxists have waited, it is true, but they have not permitted Belinsky to stand upon his entire career, but have isolated his statements of the years 1842-46 and have built their thesis about this one period. In his own words, they have "made a liar out of me, a charlatan, a dog, a donkey upon which they ride into the Jerusalem of their successes. Bulgarin could learn much from them."²³

For Belinsky was never a socialist in the Marxian sense of the word. He was a lover of liberty and was enough of a practical thinker to apply what means he could find to further the cause of human freedom. His were the principles of the French, and not the Russian Revolution. Together with his fellows, he sought to inject liberalism into Russia. He was an integral member of the intelligentsia and shared its general thoughts. With others he embraced the liberal principle and sought it wherever it might exist, even in Utopian Socialism. He was an example of the Man of 1848, a man faced with a great and significant choice between the ideals of human dignity and freedom or of inhuman absolutism and socialism. The modern Marxists have a habit of hypnotizing and magnetizing a subject by the incantations of repetitive argument, so that it becomes rigid. It is a gross injustice that Belinsky should have been cast, after his untimely death, in the form of the absolutism against which he had battled all his life. His was an "infinite passion, yet a finite heart that yearned." He yearned to be not a Marxian socialist, but—an advocate of liberty!

²²Pypin, *Belinsky*, p. 66.

²³P. I. Lebedev-Polyansky, *V. G. Belinsky*, Moscow, 1945. The invective was directed originally against Kraevsky.

Sovereignty in Soviet Law

By MARK VISHNIAK

A DISTRUSTFUL and even sharply antagonistic attitude towards the omnipotence of the state has been a firm tradition of progressive circles for the last century and a half. Liberals have usually reduced the functions of the state to the duties of a "watch-dog" protecting the security of the citizens. Socialists and syndicalists have regarded the state as an instrument of oppression and a defender of the exploiters. To anarchists it was always the primary evil, the source of all social conflict and disorder.

The state—the "Beast", the "Leviathan," "the coldest of all cold-blooded monsters"—was castigated by philosophers and moralists, such as Hobbes, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, as incompatible with the principles of religion and ethics. It was also denounced by politicians who applied to it empirical standards within three-dimensional space. Any criticism of specific measures taken by a concrete state usually implied the repudiation of the very principle of an absolute state. Even on the historical plane, the inevitable doom of the state, with a gradual curtailment of its functions and dwindling of its power, was anticipated.

The hostility to the state was as much an attribute of progressive public opinion as its opposite—the exaltation of the state and the demand for a broadening of its functions and an increase of its power—was typical of conservative and reactionary circles. These latter regarded the state as the "earthly god," according to Hegel, or in other words as the supreme and absolute value.

These two traditions are easily discernible.

Various attempts have been made to limit or to prevent the omnipotence of the state, both from within and from without.

To curb the power of the Leviathan-state from within, the division of power between several organs of the state was devised; the inalienable rights of the individual were proclaimed; the distinction was introduced between fundamental or constitutional laws and civil laws.

To curb the power of the state in external relations, the inviolability and even sacredness of international treaties was asserted; the priority of *civitas maxima* with regard to individual states was advocated; the principle of collective security was advanced; the League

of Nations was entrusted with the task of protecting racial, religious, and linguistic minorities in 14 states; the institution of international mandate and trusteeship was established; and international control was set up over "fair and humane conditions of labor" (Art. 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations).

Distrust of the all-powerful state and hostility to the state in general were also the tradition of the Russian movement of liberation. This attitude was characteristic not only of the famous Russian ideologists of anarchism—Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tolstoy—or of the Russian disciples of Stirner, Georges Sorel, or Marx and Engels. It was shared by the zealots of the Greek-Orthodox faith, the Slavophiles. "The fallacy lies not in this or that form of the state, but in the state itself, as an idea, a principle. . . . The state as such is a fallacy," wrote the famous Slavophile, Konstantin Aksakov.

If anything distinguished the Marxist Bolsheviks from other denouncers of the state, it was only the peculiarly demagogic form of their attacks.

Their most serious attempt to denounce the state is surely Lenin's unfinished work, "The State and Revolution." He wrote it in July-August 1917, in Finland, where he had fled from a trial in Russian courts on the charge of relations with the enemy in wartime; in other words, of high treason.

In this monograph Lenin takes up and sharpens the picture of the state—customary for Marxism since Engels—as an instrument of the oppression and exploitation of the working-class. The class structure of society rests upon violence and for this reason needs the state. A socialist classless society, on the other hand, has no need of violence, and so the state becomes useless and ultimately withers away.

Following the precedent established by Engels, Lenin drew a line between himself and the anarchists, yet in a purely verbal manner. The anarchists wanted "to abolish" the state, while he, Lenin, and Marxists in general just let it "wither away." The state was then and always remained for Lenin "a parasite." He asserted that "while the proletariat still needs the state, this need exists not for freedom's sake, but for the sake of crushing the enemies of the proletariat. But when it becomes possible to speak of freedom, the state as such ceases to exist."¹ The state will "wither away"—but how long it will take the state "to crush the enemies of the proletariat" before it can "wither away," Lenin has given no clue.

¹Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 390.

It is interesting to note in this connection that although in the Soviet Union Socialism has been regarded as actually realized since 1936, and so it should have become possible there (and only there, according to official theory) "to speak of freedom"—the state, nevertheless, far from "ceasing to exist," has been growing stronger and more exalted.

In 1927, Mussolini wrote an article on Fascism for the Italian Encyclopedia in which he argued that "everything is within the State and nothing human nor spiritual exists outside the State."² Ten and twenty years later, editorials appeared in the Soviet papers *Izvestia* and *Pravda* under the headline: "The interests of the state are supreme."³

II

The rise to power of the National-Socialists in Germany in 1933 strongly impressed the imagination of the whole world—not excluding that of the Communist-internationalists of the U.S.S.R. It opened their eyes to the power of the elemental nationalist emotion: for did not the German masses follow *National-Socialism* with greater enthusiasm than the Russian masses followed the *International Socialism* of the Bolsheviks in 1917? More than that: National-Socialism had come to power in a better organized and more indisputable manner and had been actively supported by a far larger section of the nation than had been the case with Bolshevism in Russia in 1917 and the following years.

The events of 1933 in Germany had their repercussion in the U.S.S.R. The Kremlin decided to turn the elemental nationalism and patriotism of the masses to its own advantage. The "mother country"—an idea and a term that had been under suspicion ever since the October Revolution—was now rehabilitated. Later it was fully reinstated, and after Russia's entry into the war it became the supreme and absolute value.

Much of the Russian past—especially the past older than a century—was now resurrected and glorified. Great military leaders of Russian history, such as Suvorov and Kutuzov, were restored to dignity, as were those most ruthless of Russian autocrats, Peter I and Ivan the Terrible, and, farther back, the prince Alexander Nevsky, canonized by the Greek-Orthodox Church. Yet the main emphasis remained, of course, upon the present and the Soviet

²Vol. XIV, p. 348.

³*Izvestia* of December 14, 1947, and *Pravda* of April 10, 1937.

régime: the Soviet mother-country, the Soviet state, the Soviet nation.

Having once ventured to look for justification and inspiration in the remote past, the Communist ideology and propaganda did not confine its search to Russian history alone. To establish itself more firmly, "the most consistent and progressive democracy" of our time discovered convenient material in French theories of the sixteenth century.

When Jean Bodin advanced the idea of the sovereignty of the state in 1576, he set it off against the unrest and turmoil of his time, due to the religious wars in France and a large part of Europe. Sovereignty for Bodin was synonymous with an authoritative and authoritarian, strong and centralized state power. For his time—a period of disintegration of the state, of its dissolution into its component parts, large and small principalities, suzerainties, and vassalages—sovereignty was a truly progressive and constructive idea.

However, in the course of its historic development, Bodin's idea inevitably resulted in the triumph of the absolute state and the identification of the ruler with the state itself, as in the celebrated formula of Louis XIV: *L'état c'est moi*. In the modern era, sovereignty lost the last features of a progressive and constructive conception. By the beginning of the present century it was relegated to the background; and after the first World War it had definitely become an obstacle to peaceful development. In the era of atomic energy, absolute sovereignty manifestly represents a menace to the very existence of mankind.

When the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia, they had more pressing matters to attend to than such abstract problems as the future of the State idea. Lenin plunged headlong into "the only legitimate, just, and truly great war of all wars known to history," the civil war; this time not *against* the power of the state but *for* the preservation and consolidation of that same power—now in the hands of the Bolsheviks.

Only much later, when the Communist Party felt secure in the saddle, did Stalinism—not Leninism—arrive at a new conception of the state and its supremacy, or sovereignty. For various reasons I am inclined to believe that the Soviet "revision" of the former concept of state is in some way connected with the rise to prominence of Andrei Vishinsky. However, the new approach received official sanction only after having been publicly formulated by Stalin himself.

This happened in 1933, when Stalin declared: "The withering away of the state will come about not through the weakening of the state power but through its strengthening to the limit, necessary to eliminate the remnants of the dying classes and to organize the defense against the capitalist encirclement which has not yet been cancelled and will not be cancelled in a short time." Stalin took up the same theme at the last convention of the Party in March, 1939. He then tried to justify the "well-organized punitive detachments" and the "sufficiently powerful state" by the existence of an international threat: only these punitive organs and a strong state will ensure "the possibility to defend the conquests of Socialism against attack from without."

At different times various encyclopedias have been issued in Soviet Russia. The publication of the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* was extended over a period of some twenty years. All these publications make it possible to follow closely the transformation of the official Soviet conception of sovereignty.

In the *Encyclopedia of State and Law* (1925-27) one reads: "The identification of state power with sovereign power does not withstand criticism either from a scientific or from a practical point of view. The governmental practice of federal states is an example of sovereignty which is incomplete and partial."⁴

In 1930 the *Small Soviet Encyclopedia* regarded sovereignty as "an abstract legal concept" which serves to conceal "the self-assertion of the dominating class striving to establish its undivided supremacy and to suppress all attempts by other classes to limit the autocracy of the dominating class."⁵

In the *Short Soviet Encyclopedia* issued in 1943 and edited by Vishinsky and others, we find already a definitely positive attitude towards the sovereignty of the state. We read: "With regard to the state, sovereignty consists in its ability, both legal and factual, to decide all questions of domestic and foreign policy independently, without recognizing any power above itself. In international law, sovereignty means the independence of the state and its supremacy over its own territory."⁶

In 1946 the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* denounced sovereignty in the past but eulogized it as applied to the Soviet state. Bodin, we read, formulated the concept of sovereignty "in order to provide a

⁴Vol. III, p. 1074.

⁵Vol. VIII, p. 525.

⁶P. 1480.

basis for royal absolutism." Rousseau, "the ideologist of the bourgeois revolution in eighteenth century France, interpreted sovereignty as the supreme power of the people. In the nineteenth century bourgeois scholars, instead of the principle of popular sovereignty, advanced the principle of the supremacy of the state." Soviet Russia today is quite another matter: the Soviet nation, its Soviets, are the bearers of sovereignty. Thus the sovereignty of the people is fully realized in the Socialist state—"both within the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics and in its foreign relations."⁷

But how to reconcile the sovereignty of the whole, of the Soviet Union, with that of its component parts, the Soviet Socialist Republics? Isn't the sovereignty of the latter "incomplete and partial"—like that of federal states according to the *Encyclopedia of State and Law* of 1925-27?

It turns out that "the sovereignty of the Union of S.S.R. not only does not exclude, but presupposes the sovereignty of the republics which compose the Union." True, Article 14 of the Constitution of 1936 restricts the sovereignty of the individual republics, but this is no way prejudices the recognition of their sovereignty, because "That limitation has been voluntarily accepted by the republics themselves." These limitations apart, every republic exercises its power of state independently, preserving the full measure of its sovereign rights—including, so it would seem, according to the Constitution, the right freely to secede from the Union. Thus, despite the fact that sovereignty is both divided and limited, "the sovereignty of the U.S.S.R. and that of the republics of the Union form an indissoluble unity, whose basis is the indivisibility of the sovereignty of the Socialist state as the expression of the supremacy of the multinational Soviet nation."⁸

If this explanation makes little sense, it should not be surprising; for the Constitution of 1936 itself contains an article (Art. 13) which maintains simultaneously that the U.S.S.R. is a Union of states, i.e. a confederacy, and a federal state, i.e. a federation.

Soviet writers and orators usually assert that their present interpretation of sovereignty is in no way contrary to their former conception as formulated by Lenin. Now and then, it is true, one encounters the admission that a certain deviation from the former viewpoint has actually occurred. But that, it is claimed, does not mean in the least that either Lenin or Stalin may be wrong.

⁷Vol. 53, p. 95.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 96.

Thus, in the *Komsomolskaya Pravda* of January 19, 1947, one reads: "Lenin has departed from us when the Soviet state was still very young." But Stalin who discovered, "after Lenin," that Socialism can be realized in one country, "thoroughly developed Lenin's doctrine of the Soviet state and [and, not *but*] posed and solved in a new way the problem of the state under Socialism and under the conditions of a capitalist encirclement."

Actually, however, the present attitude of Soviet ideologists and politicians towards the state and its sovereignty has departed a long way from Lenin's semi-anarchist approach. The Bolshevik orators in the United Nations very likely do not even suspect how closely their argumentation, and even their phrasing, repeat those of the Prussian philosopher of history, Treitschke, General Bernhardi, and other reactionary thinkers.

III

Is it necessary to dwell on a juridical analysis of the problem of sovereignty? Since in Soviet Russia any approximation to objectivity, even in exact sciences such as biology and agronomy, is not officially tolerated, it is obvious that a more or less scientific discussion of problems of law, especially public law, is out of the question.

And indeed, all that is being written about sovereignty in the so-called scientific legal literature of the U.S.S.R. is merely a repetition of the argumentation—inspired by the Party line—of Vishinsky, Gromyko, Malik, Kiselev, Arutiunov and other Soviet delegates in the UN, spiced with references to the writings of Lenin and Stalin. Sovereignty is one of the weapons used by Soviet writers to defend Soviet expansion and to attack the expansion of others. The Anglo-American "gravediggers of sovereignty" are accused by them of hiding a sinister plot against the Soviet Union behind their denunciation of the sovereign state.

The immutability and inviolability of the sovereignty of the Soviet state is the chief argument in the struggle for the unlimited veto—even the double veto—in the Security Council. The same argument is invoked to contest any plan for international inspection and control of atomic energy approved by all the other sovereign states. Sovereignty again is put forward by Soviet diplomacy to justify its refusal to agree to any kind of arbitration, even to an appeal to the International Court, although the latter includes a

Soviet judge. Sovereignty and its inviolability are pleaded to oppose the American plan for European reconstruction. The inviolable supreme right of the Soviet state over its own citizens is claimed by Soviet agents insisting upon the forced repatriation even of private persons who refuse to return to the U.S.S.R. And upon that same principle of sovereignty, Soviet jurists and diplomats base their repudiation of all projects of an international declaration and convention regarding human rights drawn up by the UN.

"These projects," writes G. Tavrov in the magazine edited by Andrei Vishinsky, "grossly violate the principle of state sovereignty, inasmuch as in many cases they fail to take into consideration the domestic legislation. Thus, for instance, Article 10 of the Declaration and Article 11 of the Convention foresee the right for a person to leave his or her country and to become a citizen of another country, without paying any attention to the inner legislation of the person's original country. . . . Such articles not only favor anti-patriotic acts of people who have lost all contact with their own country, but are a direct violation of the principle of state sovereignty and are in contradiction with UN statutes."⁹

On occasion, however, Soviet diplomats rightly maintain that the subordination of a state to international law by no means represents a limitation of its sovereignty. Thus, in the Paris session of the UN, the Soviet delegation proposed, in the name of "social humanitarianism," that death penalty in peacetime should be internationally prohibited. Mr. Pavlov argued that since the countries involved were free to modify their own penal laws, there was no question of violating national sovereignty.

Soviet diplomacy resorts to the principle of sovereignty to defend the interests of oppressed peoples against the greed of more powerful states. Thus, during the discussion of peace treaties with the satellites of Germany, Molotov (on July 31, 1946) protested in Paris against "various attempts to force upon the former satellites of Germany all kinds of external interference into their economic life," rejecting "all claims upon these countries and all pressure upon these nations which are incompatible with their state sovereignty and their national dignity."

There is hardly any need to point out in this connection, how little consideration the Soviet power showed in practice—both before and after the Paris Conference—for the sovereignty not only of

⁹*Soviet State and Law*, No. 7, 1948. Pp. 8 and 9.

Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Austria, but also for such non-satellites of Germany as China, Korea, Poland; or to recall the stubborn fight of the U.S.S.R. against the admission into the UN of sovereign Italy, Ireland, Portugal.

Confronted with these glaring contradictions and the biased advocacy of different solutions for identical problems, dependent solely on partisan considerations and political expediency—we cannot but concur with one of the most prominent Soviet authorities on international law, Professor E. Korovin, who asserts the existence of a special "Soviet conception of sovereignty." According to this Communist scholar and propagandist, "Soviet sovereignty is the first popular sovereignty in the history of mankind." This he endeavours to prove by quotations from "Lenin's great companion-in-arms—J. V. Stalin." Stalin, it is true, never wrote a single line about sovereignty; but, "as early as 1913," he compiled, with the help of Lenin and Bukharin, a pamphlet entitled "Marxism and the National Problem." The Soviet academician was compelled to fall back upon this ancient pamphlet, since he could find nothing in Stalin's writings more directly to the point, and since every Soviet author labors under the inescapable obligation to quote the authority of Stalin.¹⁰

The peculiarity of the Soviet conception of sovereignty rests, in our opinion, first in the extreme, absolute, and archaic character it lends to sovereignty, and second in the fact that sovereignty thus conceived is either defended or not defended, according to circumstances—*ad hominem* and not *ad veritatem*.

Surely Vishinsky must know that the "theory of the primacy of international law above national law" is not a recent invention and does not date from the emergence of the Soviet state, but goes as many centuries back as there has existed an international law and, in particular, a science of international law. How then is it possible to maintain that this theory has been "put into circulation" by the enemies of the Soviets with a special purpose?¹¹

Soviet jurists must know that for decades a controversy has been going on, both in theory and practice, regarding complete and incomplete, divided and double sovereignty, as well as the nature of sovereign and semi-sovereign states. The latest Soviet conception not only disregards all this—Soviet scholars no longer even mention

¹⁰Cf. "Soviet Conception of Sovereignty and Criticism of Bourgeois Theories of International Law," *Pravda*, May 3, 1947.

¹¹*Soviet State and Law*, 1948, No. I, p. 24.

it as they had done in the twenties. They are silent upon the fact that since the beginning of our century there have been few defenders of sovereignty in its absolute and unlimited form, and that a steadily growing number of jurists have been opposing the *sovereignty of law* to that of the state.

In those rare cases when the Soviet jurists allow themselves the luxury of resting from their attacks upon the external enemies—the “imperialists”—and devote themselves to the discussion of the problem of sovereignty among themselves—the debate sometimes takes on a ludicrous character. They dispute—if one may apply this word to the unilateral castigation of subordinates by their superiors—as heatedly as if the target of their criticism were not their own Soviet scholars but foreign “wreckers,” and they never go to the root of the matter, confining themselves to bickering about words and formulas. An article by Vishinsky himself in his magazine is an illuminating example.

Vishinsky does not spare his colleagues and comrades—Professors Denisov, Gurvich, Levin. Professor Denisov in particular gets a rapping for having omitted, in writing of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, “to quote the remarkable characterization of it given by comrade Stalin.” That is not all: Denisov together with Levin are guilty of having dared to give a definition of sovereignty which does not literally coincide with that canonized by Vishinsky and others. They regarded sovereignty (as the *Encyclopedia of State and Law* had done in the twenties) as “the factual and legal capacity [of the state] to make its will obligatory for all those over whom its power extends.” This is sheer “formalism,” fulminates Vishinsky, and he reminds the culprits that their definition comes very close to that of Russian jurists of the pre-Soviet era. That savours already of counter-revolution. And how, according to Vishinsky, is sovereignty correctly defined? Not as a capacity but as “the *status* of independence of a given state power from any other power both within and without the boundaries of the state.”¹² But this is mere verbalism; in practice it makes no difference whether sovereignty is defined as “capacity” or as “status.”

IV

No one is safe from attack by Soviet jurists and political writers when it comes to defending the principle of sovereignty in its most

¹²*Soviet State and Law*, 1948, No. 6, pp. 7-8.

extreme and absolute form. They assail Rightists and Leftists and even Soviet sympathizers: the *Observer* and Mr. Bevin, Léon Blum, and Einstein, the professors E. Carr, A. Cobban, Alfred Zimmern, and others.

I have before me an article by a certain Pavlov. Quoting Lenin and Molotov, he asserts: "History teaches that the national-liberating fight of the nations of Europe against the empires built upon the enslavement of small nations, was linked with the idea of national sovereignty."¹³

This is true, but it happened a long time ago. Isn't it also true that serfdom in comparison with slavery, and capitalism in comparison with feudalism represented a prodigious advance and were important milestones in the process of the emancipation of peoples? Does it mean that serfdom and capitalism still deserve eulogies and apologetics today? A relic of the remote past, sovereignty in our atomic age has become fatal to progress of any kind—social, political, economic; and in the absolute and unlimited form advocated by its latest apologists it threatens the very existence of nations.

Absolute sovereignty of the state—like all absolutes—excludes the possibility of the peaceful coexistence of states which are unwilling to sacrifice the least part of their own absolute supremacy. In concrete political terms this has been pointedly expressed by the Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak in his address of September 28, 1948, before the last UN Assembly. Said he, addressing the Soviet delegation: "We are afraid because in this Assembly you have made yourselves the champions of the doctrine of absolute national sovereignty and because we ask ourselves how an international organization can fulfill the purposes assigned to it if this obsolete and—as I said last year—reactionary doctrine triumphs. An international organization can function only when all nations—small, medium, and great—have realized fully that above their individual wills there exists international law."

To this Vishinsky replied in his speech of October 1: "I repeat—never will such a situation arise. Nobody will blind and confuse us with all kinds of grandiloquent statements and beautiful words about the necessity of waiving part of our national sovereignty in the name of the higher welfare of mankind."

Vishinsky, Molotov, and others have repeatedly asserted that "the theory of the limitation of national sovereignty—radically

¹³*Pravda*, July 20, 1947.

conflicting with the idea of the United Nations—tends to destroy this organization and to justify the tendency to expansion of America and Britain.”¹⁴

The thrust against America and Britain apart, it must be admitted that the difference in the conception of the essential principle of the UN—which is constantly feeding the mutual antagonism—is here correctly stated. Spaak, Bevin, and others are convinced that collective security and the UN presuppose and rest upon a partial but obligatory limitation of national sovereignty. The U.S.S.R. and its satellites—while participating in the UN—nevertheless radically and on principle repudiate this *basic* premise. In such a situation, the “mutual understanding” to which so much lip-service is being paid remains an illusion.

For this reason the problem of sovereignty is not one for legal experts alone. It is a problem that involves the very existence of the UN and the peace of the world—and in this every single individual is today vitally interested.

¹⁴V. Frantzev, “Ideology of Bourgeois Nationalism,” *Bolshevik*, 1947, No. 8, p. 42.

The Visit of the Russian Fleet to the United States: Were Americans Deceived?

By WILLIAM E. NAGENGAST

CONTEMPORARY historiography has judged American interpretation of the visit of the Russian fleet to this country during the fall and winter of 1863-64 without an adequate examination of American reaction to this event. Current scholarship asserts that our citizenry was naive to the extent of attributing unselfish and altruistic motives to a naval maneuver which in actuality had as its sole purpose the avoidance of blockade in European waters by hostile English and French fleets.¹ At the present time it is believed that American ignorance of Russian apprehension of being "bottled up" in the Baltic and Black Seas as occurred in the Crimean War led our people to assume this Muscovite naval demonstration in the ports of the United States to be a gesture of Tsarist sympathy and support for the Union. This assumption, we are informed, was "demolished" only when research in the Russian archives in 1915 by an American scholar² unearthed Tsar Alexander's secret orders to his fleet. The impression received from reading the accepted accounts pertaining to the visit of the fleet is that Russia, prior to 1915, successfully deluded the people of the United States into believing that her naval demonstration was undertaken in their behalf. As a recent writer on Russo-American relations states:

A legend grew up of Russia's gallant gesture to uphold the Union which would persist for more than half a century, and only to be completely demolished when historic research in the Russian archives finally brought to light the Tsar's secret orders to the fleet.³

¹This hostility was due to the Polish crisis which in 1863 had resulted in a division of Europe into the opposing camps of Russia and Prussia on the one hand, and France and England on the other.

²Frank A. Golder. Professor Golder's findings are contained in his article, "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War" in the *American Historical Review*, XX, 1915, II, 802.

³Foster Rhea Dulles, *The Road to Teheran*, 1945, p. 59.

That this research in the Russian archives was based exclusively on Russian sources did not deter American historians from accepting it as an accurate pronouncement concerning American reaction to this Muscovite visit.⁴ In the words of a foremost diplomatic historian:

It [the fleet] was hailed as a friendly gesture from the Tsar Alexander II, who had just abolished serfdom in Russia, to a nation which had just abolished slavery. This explanation was accepted by historians until 1915 when the late Professor F. A. Golder, after examining the Russian archives . . . showed that the cruises were made in anticipation of possible war with Great Britain over the Polish question, and with a view of getting the fleet out of the Baltic to distant seas where it could damage the British merchant marine.⁵

A text in popular usage today upholds the view that, except for a "few," American knowledge of the "bottling up" motive for the dispatch of the Tsarist vessels to the United States was dependent upon subsequent research in the Russian archives. The author states: "Although a few of the more clear-headed or cynical guessed that there was something ulterior behind the visit of the fleets, it was not until 1915 that the Russian archives gave up their secret."⁶

Contemporary writers on Russo-American relations which treat this period of diplomacy have likewise endorsed this interpretation respecting contemporary American public opinion. Foster Rhea Dulles asserts:

Neither the American public nor apparently the American government knew the real explanation for the Russians' presence in our harbors. A contemporary

⁴Professor Golder may be criticized for overstepping the bounds of his study by passing judgment on American opinion without a study of the main sources responsible for the formation of this opinion. In the article cited previously, he concludes: "Russia had not in mind to help us but did render us a distinct service; the United States was not conscious that it was contributing in any way to Russia's welfare yet seems to have saved her from humiliation and perhaps war." Golder, *op. cit.*, p. 812. Italics mine.

⁵Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, 1947, pp. 366-367n.

⁶Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 1945, p. 397.

Bailey concurs in the view that Americans were not generally aware of the reason for the fleet's visit. In the text above cited he states: "The American assumption that this was primarily a gesture of friendship was based upon a misapprehension . . ." and in an article published in 1934 he wrote: "If Professor Golder's revelations had been common knowledge in 1867, the story [of America's purchase of Alaska] might well have been different; but, as it was, a majority of the American people were convinced that disinterestedness and friendship had prompted the course of the Tsar in 1863, and they formed their opinions accordingly." "Why the United States Purchased Alaska," *The Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 3, 1934. Italics mine.

article in *Harper's Weekly* shrewdly interpreted it as somehow related to the European situation, recalling that the Russian fleet had been bottled up at Kronstadt and in the Black Sea during the Crimean War. The country as a whole, however, did not stop to reason why.⁷

Another authority on Russia conveys to the reader the impression that Americans were unaware of the real reason for the visit of the Tsarist vessels, for he is of the belief that "the incident of the visit of the Russian navy exerted a deceptive influence on American public opinion."⁸ This same writer offers the curious information that American friendship for Russia due to this naval demonstration is regarded as a "legend" by Soviet, as well as American authorities, and cites a recent Russian study which, he states, "refers to this concept [of Russian friendship] as a legend and gives a detailed account of its development."⁹

However, a reading of American newspapers and magazines for the first two months of the squadrons' presence reveals that the press, both North and South¹⁰ with astonishing unanimity, perceived and stated the real object of the fleet's visit. From the time of the arrival of the first vessels, the popular journals of the day displayed an understanding of European diplomacy and the motives behind this Russian naval maneuver.

⁷Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 59. Dulles' version of American unawareness of the true reason for the dispatch of the Tsarist fleet to the United States agrees substantially with the account of Benjamin P. Thomas, "Russo-American Relations 1815-1867" in *Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science*, 1930, XLVIII. Thomas adds Charles Sumner and an article in a 1905 edition of the *North American Review* by Oscar Strauss to the "few" who "suspected that the fleet was sent with a view to its own safety." (P. 138.)

⁸David J. Dallin, *The Big Three: The United States, Britain, Russia*, 1945, p. 246. Dallin writes: "Actually, the navy had been instructed to take no part in American affairs, and the ovations and banquets tendered the officers were, strictly speaking, not earned."

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 247. The Russian work cited is M. Malkin, *The Civil War in the United States and Tsarist Russia*, Moscow, 1939.

¹⁰This writer has deliberately omitted from this article selections from representative Confederate newspapers. These consistently state that the object of the Russian presence in northern ports was to avoid being bottled up in home waters by English or French vessels. Inasmuch as contemporary writers do not maintain that the South was deceived by the Russian visit, it is aside from the purpose of this article to cite here other than northern comments. Southern opinion regarding the Russians will appear in this author's forthcoming work on the influence of Tsarist Russia on the United States. In articles and satirical verse, the South displayed a predominantly hostile attitude toward the Russians and all things Russian.

Only one day after Horace Greeley's *New York Tribune*¹¹ announced the arrival of two Russian ships in New York harbor, the British journal of that city, the *Albion*, informed its readers that the western powers of Europe were not deceived by this recent Tsarist maneuver. It declared: "There was a possibility of war. Russia did not desire to have all her squadron shut up at Kronstadt. She preferred that a portion of it, at least, should enjoy the immunities of a neutral and friendly port. Hence the gathering."¹²

The American Secretary of the Navy revealed his awareness that the Tsarist ships' presence in the United States enabled them to be in active service during the winter months. Upon the news of their arrival, Gideon Welles commented in his diary: "The Russian fleet has come out of the Baltic and are now in New York, or a large number of the vessels have arrived. They are not to be confined by a northern winter."¹³

On September 26, James Gordon Bennett's *New York Herald* not only disclosed an acute understanding of the real reason behind this naval visit, but announced where American sympathy would lie, should a Franco-Russian war occur. Anti-French sentiments were apparent in the *Herald's* declaration: "Should France and Russia go to war, the Tsar would find then as now a refuge for his vessels in our harbors and our hearty sympathy for his success in the struggle with a nation [France] which has forfeited, through the treachery of its ruler, our good will and alliance."¹⁴

The *New York Evening Post* did not delay in interpreting the Muscovite naval demonstration as a maneuver directed against France and England. It immediately observed that the Russians' presence offered a warning to France and England: "It is a notice to France and England that there is another naval power besides theirs which

¹¹The *New York Tribune* of September 25, 1863, announced the arrival of the *Neusky* and *Peresvet*, followed on September 27 by the *Varyag* and *Vityaz*. On October 15, the appearance of the *Almaz* and *Oslyaba* completed the picture of six Russian men-of-war anchored off Staten Island.

San Francisco was similarly visited by a Russian squadron of five vessels. The *Daily Alta California* of San Francisco in its November 18, 1863, issue gives an excellent detailed account of the armament, weight, and personnel of the Russian vessels in that harbor. For a less detailed account of the weight, horsepower, armament and personnel of the Russian vessels arriving in New York harbor, see *The New York Times* of September 26, 1863.

¹²September 26, 1863.

¹³*Diary of Gideon Welles*, ed. John T. Morse, 1911. September 25, 1863, I, 443.

¹⁴September 26, 1863.

is able to show itself in the Atlantic, and if necessary, to combat there as bravely as in the Baltic."¹⁵

The *Post* also reminded the French Emperor and Lord Russell of England:

Louis Napoleon will make no violent demonstrations against Russia while a powerful squadron is within reach of Vera Cruz or Tampico and the French ships in the neighborhood. Nor do we imagine Lord Russell would care for an outbreak at this moment, when the commerce of the West Indies and the cotton clandestinely obtained from rebeldom, and piled up in Nassau and Bermuda, might be at the mercy of Admiral Lessovsky.¹⁶

The *Commercial Advertiser* of New York City was far from deluded by Tsar Alexander's maneuver. On October 2, it stated that in the event of a French-English war versus Russia over Poland, it was a shrewd maneuver for the Tsar to have at least a part of his fleet where it could prey upon commerce and not frozen up in the Gulf of Finland.¹⁷

The *Cincinnati Gazette*, in an article entitled "Russia and the Western Powers," felt that the outbreak of an European war over the Polish question would automatically result in the blockade of Russia's navy by English seapower. It informed its readers:

The situation suggests that a precaution, in view of ulterior events, may have caused the rendezvous of a Russian squadron at New York. Winter seals up the Russian ports, and, aside from that, an Atlantic port and a Western squadron would furnish Russia great conveniences in case of a war with England and France.¹⁸

The Mid-West's awareness of the motive for the fleet's dispatch to New York is evident in the *Chicago Evening Journal* comment of October 5:

The Russian Government was undoubtedly willing, in the event of an European war for Poland, to leave her powerful fleet in a position where it could be effectively used against the commerce of France and England; instead of being frozen up around Kronstadt, and liable to another blockade.

Anti-French and anti-British implications of this Muscovite maneuver were obvious to the *Journal*. "The fact that she [Russia] has

¹⁵September 28, 1863.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷An exhaustive and detailed study of New York City opinion regarding the Polish insurrection of 1863 is the admirable work of Arthur Prudden Coleman and Marion Moore Coleman, *The Polish Insurrection of 1863 in the Light of New York Editorial Opinion*, 1934.

¹⁸October 3, 1863, Cincinnati, Ohio.

such a naval force at large will be a powerful argument with Napoleon [of France] and Palmerston [of England] against attacking her."¹⁹

The implication of this maneuver was not lost on the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. On the following day, Senator Sumner of Massachusetts wrote John Bright in England:

You will observe the hobnobbing at New York with the Russian admiral. Why is that fleet gathered there? My theory is that when it left the Baltic, war with France was regarded as quite possible, and it was determined not to be sealed up at Kronstadt; if at New York, they could take the French expedition at Vera Cruz.²⁰

It was all too obvious to Thurlow Weed that the Russians did not intend to repeat the mistakes they had committed nine years before in their war versus France and England. The *Albany Evening Journal* of Albany, N. Y., informed its readers: "It is conjectured here that the explanation of the appearance of Russian vessels-of-war in our waters is to secure them from being blockaded, as was the case during the Crimean War."²¹ This same notice appeared in the *Troy Daily Press* of nearby Troy the same day. Three days later in a dispatch from Washington, the *Albany Evening Journal* explained further:

There are many theories as to the cause of this movement of the Russian navy, but the general belief is that the emperor [Tsar Alexander] expects to keep his fleet cruising during the winter months, lest some difficulties with his neighbors might arise, and find them as they found him once before [in the Crimean War], ice bound in his own harbors.²²

The *Daily Whig* of Troy, N. Y., accepted this interpretation. In its announcement, "More Russian Vessels," it wrote:

The Tsar evidently means to have his arms united, in case France or all the other powers wish to attack him. When the Crimean War broke out, he was almost entirely helpless so far as his marine was concerned, the allies blockading his ports and shutting in all his ships, which were already ice-locked. This time, he does not intend to be caught in that way.²³

By October 10, the Anglophile *Albion* of New York City bore out the American observation that this Russian naval demonstration was a maneuver aimed at England. It angrily announced:

¹⁹October 5, 1863.

²⁰*Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner*, Edward L. Pierce, 1893, IV, 146. Letter dated October 6, 1863.

²¹October 5, 1863.

²²October 8, 1863.

²³October 9, 1863.

Having negotiated until assured that England and Austria would not fight, having strengthened the Tsar's military material, and having put a considerable portion of his fleet in a place of safety, he [Tsar Alexander] now throws off the mask, and shows in its true colours the Tartar which, the proverb tells us, always lurks beneath the Russian skin.²⁴

The *Albion* censured the American press for its Muscovite sympathy: "The American press, we regret to say, in its blind worship of an incongruous idol, finds something smart and even glorious in this early deference to foreign remonstrance, followed up as it is by a defiant attitude now assumed."²⁵

No less hostile toward the Russians was the French *Courier Des Etats Unis* of New York City which that same day [October 10] informed Frenchmen in the United States:

L'empereur Alexandre aurait pour but, par cette concentration, d'avoir des forces maritimes imposantes à sa disposition, afin de parer à toute éventualité qui pourrait survenir pendant l'hiver prochain, ou au commencement du printemps, alors que la navigation serait encore empêchée par les glaces dans les eaux de l'empire moscovite.

The *Providence Daily Journal*²⁶ felt that the dispatch of the fleet to America enabled Russia to prepare for war with France over the menacing Polish question. This newspaper of Rhode Island's capital city published the Tsar's rejection of Napoleon III's Polish mediation proposal, with the observation:

Meantime Russia is hastening her preparations for war. By her diplomatic skill she has postponed the active intervention of France in behalf of Poland, until it is too late for a campaign to be undertaken this year. She has till next spring to make ready for any emergency. She is having four thousand heavy cannon cast in England. She is preparing to sink vessels in the harbor of Kronstadt. She has sent a large fleet to this country to be ready for action in an emergency. They could sweep French or English commerce from the seas. It must be confessed that thus far Russia has completely outwitted her opponents, and is for the present, at least, in complete mastery of the situation.

New York City's *Harper's Weekly* was not unlike the other American journals in ascertaining the motive for the fleet's dispatch. On October 17, it stated: "The Tsar . . . has sent a fleet into our waters, in order that, if war should occur, British and French commerce should not escape as cheaply as they did in the Crimean contest." This publication was outspoken in advocating a Russian-American alliance.

²⁴October 10, 1863.

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶October 10, 1863. Providence, Rhode Island.

The following week (October 24) *Leslie's Illustrated Journal* declared:

The friendly harbors of the United States will enable them [the Russians] to transfer the war to the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico, and interfere sadly with the operations of Napoleon in Mexico. A few vessels would effectually blockade the whole coast, and require France to maintain an immense fleet in the Gulf. Then, too, by the new rules of international law introduced by England and France, Russia can fit out in our ports privateers, as the rebels have done in the ports of England, and with the better right, as Russia is a recognized Government, and not a mere rebellious gathering like Jeff Davis', Nena Sahib, or the Fenians. The ocean lighted up with burning French or perhaps English vessels may throw some light on questions of international law which are now somewhat obscure.

The *Chicago Post* on October 26 reproduced an article of the English *Liverpool Courier* revealing to Americans that the significance of this Russian naval maneuver was not lost abroad. The article declared: "Ice, if not an enemy, would seal up the Baltic; the British Mediterranean fleet would suffice to check the Russian vessels there," adding the observation of the *Liverpool Courier*: "The damage a squadron of light frigates might inflict on our Atlantic trade is almost incalculable." The English paper was quoted as stating: "The friendly harbor of New York offered the best position that could be conceived for a station from whence at any moment a combined fleet of Russians and Americans could swoop down upon our scattered squadron and our unarmed merchantmen."

New York City's *Independent* of November 5 took minute pains to explain to its readers why, should a European war occur, geographic factors would aid England and France automatically to seal up Russia's fleet in the Baltic.

A glance at the map will indicate the peculiar naval disadvantage to which Russia is exposed. Her territories lie far within the coast line of the continent, wholly on the eastern side of Europe. She touches salt water only on the extremities of her vast area. The Black Sea is wholly closed by Turkey; the Arctic Ocean is impracticable for maritime armaments; the Atlantic she reaches only through the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea. Her great naval arsenal of Kronstadt lies more than 1,200 miles from the open ocean. The passage through which she must reach it consists, for the last 500 miles, of the difficult and tortuous navigation of the narrow Straits of Denmark. The occupation of these Straits by an allied or even by an English fleet, would effectually close the passage against her, deprive her of all access to the ocean, and condemn her fleet to inaction under the guns of her fortresses. Even if she were to gain the German [North] Sea, she must still make her way through the Straits of Dover, and along the very coast of France, within cannonshot of Cherbourg and in sight of Brest, the great French maritime arsenals, or sail

for 500 miles further around the hostile shores of Scotland and through the stormy Hebrides, ere her ships could have a fair field for any enterprise against the commerce of her enemies. Within the Baltic, too, she must sail for 1,000 miles in sight of the Swedish coast; and Sweden is bustling with preparations for a participation in the coming war, which she fondly hopes is to give her Finland again. Sweden might throw a fleet into those narrow seas; and with such an obstacle within the Baltic, and a combined French and English fleet outside of it, one may conceive how slender Russia's naval chances would be against such a coalition. But with her fleet abroad upon the high seas, and in a state of readiness for action, she is in a position, in case hostilities should occur, to harass the commerce of her opponents all over the globe.

San Francisco was equally aware that the Russian fleet had come to America to avoid being blockaded in home waters by hostile European powers. A Russian squadron had dropped anchor within the Golden Gate in October. The *Daily Alta California* of this city viewed this squadron's presence as an indication that the Tsar did not intend to be caught twice in the same predicament.

. . . During the Crimean War, the Russians were taken at a disadvantage. Their fleets were shut up in the ports of the Black Sea, the Baltic, and Manchuria; and they had neither men-of-war nor privateers to attack the British and French in their most vulnerable place—their commerce. . . . The Russian Government, perhaps, does not intend to be caught now as she was caught ten years ago. Two fleets, each of five war steamers, have been sent to American ports, where they can neither be taken nor blockaded; and in case of hostilities, they can reach the open sea without difficulty.²⁷

This West Coast journal was not hesitant in proclaiming that should a war break out between Russia and the English-French forces, it would be happy to be of service to any Russian privateers which would care to seek its port.

The *Knickerbocker Monthly*²⁸ of New York likewise interpreted this Muscovite naval maneuver to signify Tsarist fear of being bottled up in the Baltic Sea. The Polish question had resulted in bellicose nations in Europe and "to the uncertainty of the issue of this correspondence [over Poland], may doubtless be attributed the scattering of a portion of the Russian navy, so as to have it available for operations at sea."

Harpers New Monthly Magazine in its "Monthly Record of Current Events" for November, 1863, commented:

In the present position in European politics the presence of these vessels in our ports has a special significance. During the late Crimean War the Russian fleet was closely shut up at Kronstadt and in the Black Sea, and was unable to

²⁷November 18, 1863.

²⁸November, 1863, p. 480.

render any effective service. The Russians have now quite an effective naval force in the open seas. The experience of the *Alabama* and *Florida* [Confederate corsairs] shows how much damage may be effected by one or two armed vessels upon the commerce of an enemy. . . . The Russian vessels now at large, with such aid as we can give, in precise accordance with the course of the English Government toward us, could render the commerce of England insecure.

Almost a full year later, Boston's *Living Age*²⁹ presented its readers with "a curious piece of information" concerning the Russian plan of war in 1863, had England and France declared war on Russia over the Polish question. The "information" was the Russian plan of war which it quoted the London *Times* explaining:

Taking a lesson from the *Alabama*, the Russian admirals on the Californian and American coasts had been ordered to leave their stations and rendezvous in mid-ocean at a place only defined by latitude and longitude and then hold themselves in readiness to bear down in case of war, first on Melbourne, then Hobart Town, then Adelaide, then Sydney, and then New Zealand. The ships, it is added, that were to be detached from the New York station would have numbered one hundred and fifty-six guns, and those from Japan and California forty-three, and the naval force was 2,971 seamen and one hundred and twenty-seven officers. The vessels were armed with sixty eight-pounders; but those on the New York station were to buy whatever rifled guns they might want.³⁰

This brief survey of American editorial comment refutes the assumption of present day scholarship that our people regarded the Russian fleet's presence as an act of friendship due to their unawareness that these squadrons were dispatched to the United States to avoid being blockaded in Russian harbors. American interpretation of the Russian visit as a gesture of sympathy and support for the Union was based on the knowledge that the squadrons had been sent to this country to avoid being bottled up in home ports, in the event a European war occurred in 1863 over the Polish question. The American public, as demonstrated in their press, displayed an acute grasp of European diplomacy, that comprehended that self-interest was the driving motivation behind Russia's diplomatic maneuvers. Americans believed that if a European war occurred in which Russia was involved, Alexander II would follow the tactics exemplified by the *Alabama* and her sister corsairs, operating from American bases. The press, both North and South, perceived and stated the real object of the fleet's visit.

²⁹October 29, 1864.

³⁰October 29, 1864.

The Soviet Currency Reform

By B. ALEXANDROV

THE currency reform carried out by the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. and the Central Committee of the Communist Party on December 14, 1947, is the result of the inflation caused by World War II.

It is the second currency reform in the history of Soviet Russia. The first was carried out in 1922-1924 after World War I and the Revolution.

There is some significant data concerning this inflation:

	<i>Issued Notes</i> (in billions of rubles)		<i>Price Index</i> (1914 = 1)		<i>Real Value of Issued Notes</i> (in billions of rubles)
	1914	1.2	1.0		1.2
January	1917	9.9	3.0		3.3
October	1917	18.9	7.5		2.5
November	1917	28.3	12.8		2.2
January	1923	1,994,464.5	21,242,000.0		0.094

In the two and one-half years preceding the Revolution, the amount of issued paper money increased by 8 billion and the prices by 3 billion. In the short period of the Provisional government, the quantity of money increased by 9 billion rubles and the price index rose from 3.0 to 7.5, so that the total real value of the increased amount of money fell from 3.3 to 2.5 billion rubles. After the Bolshevik revolution, the inflation progressed with increasing speed. At the beginning of 1923, the quantity of money in circulation reached about 2 quadrillion rubles, the price index increased by 21 times that of prewar times, and the whole real value or purchasing power of this astronomical quantity of money fell to the small sum of 94 million rubles.¹

The complete failure of the Bolshevik monetary policy forced the Soviet government in 1922-1924 into a series of currency reforms. They consisted of: The two devaluations of 1922 and 1923, the issue of *chervonetz*, covered at 25% by gold or stable foreign currency and at 75% by short-term bills (October 11, 1922), the issue of the state treasury notes (February 14, 1924), the issue of new silver and copper coins (February 22, 1924), the withdrawal of old money with

¹These figures are analogous to those of the German, Austrian, and other inflations after World War I.

its sharp devaluation (March 7, 1924), and, finally, the decree of July 1, 1924, which forbade new emissions of paper money for covering budgetary deficits.

The monetary reform of 1922-1924 relieved the crisis, but did not stabilize the currency. In spite of all sacrifices of the population, the enormous investments of the Five-Year-Plans required new emissions of paper money. The quantity of money grew and prices rose.²

Banknotes, Treasury Notes and Coins (in billion rubles)			Total	Price Index (1913 = 100)
January 1, 1924	—	—	0.3	182
January 1, 1925	0.4	0.3	0.7	198
January 1, 1930	1.5	1.2	2.7	221
January 1, 1937	8.0	3.2	11.2	—

During World War II, the total budgetary expenditures almost doubled, and military expenditures more than trebled. Total expenditures of 665 billion rubles between January, 1937, and June, 1941, rose to 1,032.9 billion rubles from July, 1941, to December, 1945, while military expenditures jumped from 166 to 548.2 billion rubles.

In spite of a special war tax, intensive sale of state loan bonds, "voluntary" donations to the state, and contributions to defense funds, the growing state revenues could not cover the increased wartime expenditures. The surplus remained in circulation, intensifying and accelerating the inflation. At the same time, large amounts of money accumulated in the hands of the population from the scarcity of consumers' goods. For two years after the war, the supply of money continued to increase. According to an estimate,³ prices "approximately doubled" between 1940 and 1947. While state prices of rationed goods were still kept at a very low relative level, the influence of the growing inflation manifested itself much more in market prices of the non-rationed market. The decree on devaluation of the ruble confesses that "the decrease in state and co-operative trade in consumer goods, and the population's increased demand at the collective-farm markets led to an acute increase in market prices, which in some periods exceeded pre-war prices by 10 or 15 times." Under such conditions, speculation was inevitable.

²The publication of official prices indexes was suspended by the Soviet government in 1931. Some authors (see Paul A. Baran, "Currency Reform in the USSR," *Harvard Business Review*, March 1948, p. 196) think that "from 1928 to 1940, the retail prices must have increased by around 143%."

³*Op. cit.*, pp. 198-199.

Despite the constant assertions of the Soviet government that the Soviet Union, in contrast to capitalistic states, has neither a black market nor speculation, the decree on devaluation acknowledges the fact of existing speculation and says: "Of course, speculative elements made use of the existence of a great gap between state prices and market prices, as well as of the large quantity of false money, to accumulate great profits at the expense of the population." Speculation in the Soviet Union was so highly developed that, according to the words of the decree, "It is also intolerable that the speculative elements who enriched themselves during the war by accumulating considerable sums of money should have an opportunity to buy up goods after the abolition of the rationing system."

This was the problem of currency, trade, and prices in 1947, when the Soviet government decided to abolish the ration-card system for food and industrial goods and change to free sale at unified state prices. The government made this decision for several reasons, particularly to rid itself of responsibility for the irregularity in supplying rationed consumers' goods. But the requisite for abolishing the ration-card system and introducing the system of free sale was devaluation of the ruble to diminish the quantity of money in circulation and attain equilibrium between the demand and supply of consumers' goods without increasing the quantity of these goods.

The currency reform of 1947, known in part to some American readers,⁴ was effected on the following basis:

(1) All cash in the hands of the population, state, co-operatives, public enterprises, organizations, institutions and collective farms, as well as money in transit in the form of inland money orders, letters of credit and bank transfers paid to individual citizens, was subject to exchange at the rate of 10 old rubles for 1 new ruble, excepting coins, which remained in circulation at their face values.

(2) Deposits and current accounts in the State Bank and savings banks were converted on the following terms: Deposits up to 3,000 rubles were revalued at the rate of 1 to 1, deposits from 3,000 to 10,000 rubles at 3 to 2, deposits over 10,000 rubles at 2 to 1, deposits of co-operative enterprises and organizations, as well as of collective farms, were revalued at the rate of 5 to 4, while deposits of state and public enterprises were untouched by the devaluation.

(3) Simultaneously with the currency reform, a conversion of all

⁴See the quoted article in *Harvard Business Review* and the full text of the decree of December 14, 1947, in the "World Report," December 23, 1947.

previously issued state loans and savings bank certificates for special deposits into a 2 per cent unified conversion loan of 1948 was brought about at the rate of 3 rubles in old bonds for 1 ruble in new bonds. Exempted were the second state loan for the restoration and development of the national economy of the U. S. S. R. issued in 1947, and the new freely circulating state 3 per cent internal lottery loan issued on December 13, 1937, neither of which were subject to conversion, while the state lottery loan of 1938 was converted into the 1937 lottery loan at the rate of 5 rubles to 1 in bonds.

From the day of the proclamation until August 1, 1948, the regular drawings on loans were suspended, along with payment of maturing coupons of bonds for converted loans. Regular drawings and payments had to be resumed from August, 1948, including those for the preceding period. Rates of taxation, the extent of debts and contract obligations between enterprises, institutions or organizations regarding payments from the population to the state, and the extent of treaty obligations between the U. S. S. R. and foreign states have remained unchanged. Because the decree does not mention the debts of citizens to one another, like the debts of organizations and institutions to individual citizens, they apparently were subject to conversion at the rate of 10 to 1.

The reform hit the hardest the holders of cash money and bank deposits. In view of the actual distribution of cash money and deposits among the different classes of the Soviet population, this unequal devaluation of different kinds of money represents not only more favorable treatment of poorer individuals, but also the favoring of one class, urban workers, at the expense of the peasants. This gives the Soviet currency reform the same character of social inequality which characterizes all economic and social policy of the Soviet régime. In this respect, the new Soviet currency reform is the continuation of the same fight against the well-to-do peasants, the kulaks, which implemented the collectivization of Russian agriculture.

Concerning current income, the decree says that "the wages of workers and employees, the income of peasants from state deliveries, and other labor incomes of all sections of the population will not be affected by the reform but will be paid in the new money at the previous rates." On the other hand, the scale of new unified state retail prices, introduced by the reform of December 14, 1947, has reduced the price for bread and flour by 12%, for cereals by 10%, preserved, in general, the prices for other foodstuffs, and reduced

the prices for industrial goods by two thirds, as compared with previous commercial prices. Under the unchanging current incomes and new unified prices, the situation of workers and employees may be better, if they actually receive the needed consumers' goods in the state or co-operative stores at the state retail prices. The peasants will lose, not only as owners of the hoarded money but also as sellers of food in the open market, if the scarcity of foodstuffs does not raise their free market prices over the state prices again.

The effect of the currency reform on the other less numerous social classes of the Soviet society is not significant, although it is very typical of the social relations in today's Soviet state. I refer to the advantages received from the currency and price reform by the Soviet "aristocracy," i.e., by high state and party officials, Stakhanovites, "shock" workers, and other privileged industrial workers, specialists, writers, and artists.

However, more important than its transitional effect on different social classes is the question: will the Soviet government succeed in preserving the new currency created by the reform of 1947, and in preventing the appearance of a new inflation? Inflation has been hitherto almost wedded to Soviet economy, accompanying it like a shadow not only in wartime, but also during the years of peace. We have seen that, after the currency reform of 1922-1924, in spite of peace, renewed inflation began even in 1925 with the raise of prices and the gap between state prices and free market prices. The inflation of that time was caused by state expenditures in carrying out the Five-Year-Plans. But it is no secret that the Soviet government is now introducing new, immense expenditures to carry out the new Five-Year-Plan for restoration and development of the national economy of U. S. S. R. between 1946 and 1950, and especially strengthening the military potential of the Soviet Union. Will the currency reform of 1947 under such conditions be steady or be broken down by a new inflation, as it happened with the reform of 1922-1924? The near future will give an answer to this question.

But the currency reform of 1947 was the prerequisite for passing from the ration-card system to the system of free sale of food and industrial goods at unified state prices. The most essential question is, therefore, the functioning of the new supply system. Has this system in fact given the population the possibility of receiving the necessary quantities of consumers' goods at the state prices?

The first partial answer to this question is the significant fact that despite the reform, special stores with restricted customer member-

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ship (so-called "closed distributors") are preserved. Privileged groups of citizens can buy goods in these stores which are inaccessible to the majority of the population. This testifies to the scarcity of these goods. The second is the long queues standing again, despite other hopes, around the stores selling bread and other essential goods. Many people go away from these stores without receiving the goods, and are forced to the black market. The third answer concerns numerous articles in the Soviet newspapers criticizing the work of several state and co-operative stores. The defects of their work do not, however, consist only of "little defects of organization," as the Soviet press represents the situation, but are the manifestation of profound and essentially characteristic traits of the Soviet economy in general. They cannot be removed only by the currency reform and the abolition of the ration-card system.

Another interesting question in connection with the currency reform is the structure of new state prices, and the real income which the Soviet workers receive after the currency reform of 1947. But such an analysis exceeds the scope of this article.

From Peter Struve's Unpublished Correspondence

By GLEB STRUVE

FIVE years ago, on February 26, 1944, my father, Peter Struve, one of the outstanding representatives of Russian national-liberal thought, died in German-occupied Paris. He still awaits his biographer, as well as a critical appraisal of his manifold activities.¹ Apart from being an outstanding scholar in the field of political economy and a man of extraordinary erudition in a variety of other fields, he was also a prominent political thinker of great integrity, fearless independence, and passionate temperament. Prince D. S. Mirsky, who at the time by no means shared Struve's views, wrote of him in his *Contemporary Russian Literature*: "Saturated with a deep feeling and profound understanding of Russian history, he is certainly one of the most brilliant political writers of our times, and his short articles are sometimes masterpieces of concentrated thought and direct expression. . . . When party feeling grows less acute he will be recognized as one of the classics of Russian political thought and political literature."²

Evolving from an early leader of the Russian so-called Legal Marxists in the nineties of the last century into one of the leaders of the Russian counter-revolution after 1917, Struve remained essentially, to the end of his days, a liberal, a champion of individual freedom. In the last years of his life his liberalism was re-kindled

¹Little has been written about Peter Struve since his death. The elements of his political biography are contained in the unfinished article by Boris Nicolaevsky, the first instalment of which appeared in *Novy Zhurnal* (New York), No. X, 1946. Of great importance and interest to Struve's future biographer will be his own unfinished Memoirs, and especially the chapter entitled "My Contacts and Conflicts with Lenin," where Struve tells how and why he became a Socialist and discusses the beginnings of Russian Marxism and its controversy with Populism. This and another chapter from the same Memoirs, ("My Contacts with Rodichev") appeared in *The Slavonic and East European Review* (London, vols. XII-XIII, 1934); they have so far not been published in Russian. An estimate of Struve's personality and political rôle, written by his late friend, Dr. Harold Williams, appeared in the same review in 1923 (Vol. II).

²Prince D. S. Mirsky, *Contemporary Russian Literature*, London 1926, p. 179.

d afresh by way of reaction to the growth and spreading of modern totalitarianism. During those years, after 1934, he was deprived, by force of circumstances, of the possibility of voicing publicly his opinions on current politics. He returned to academic and scholarly work and was engaged in revising (and re-writing in German) his capital work on theoretical political economy (*Economy and Price*, 1913-1916) and in writing two new important works, *An Economic and Social History of Russia from the Earliest Times to Our Days* and *A History of Economic Thought*. Of these, only part of the former was ready for the press when he died. But in him the politician always co-existed with the scholar, and he never lost his keen interest in current events. His views had to be expressed in private conversation and in the correspondence which he carried on with his numerous friends in various countries from Belgrade, where he had made his residence after 1928. Unlike many Russian émigrés who belonged more or less to the same political camp, he took from the very first a clear-cut, hostile attitude to Hitler and National-Socialism. With the years this hostility grew into a passionate aversion, and in 1938, when he went to London to do some work in the library of the British Museum, he refused to set his foot on the soil of Hitlerite Germany, preferring to travel by the roundabout way, through Italy and Switzerland: for him, who had always had a great admiration and respect for German culture, National-Socialism was defiling the land of Goethe.

Struve spent the days of the Munich crisis in London. His rejection of the policy of appeasement was emphatic and uncompromising. He welcomed Chamberlain's flight to Godesberg as a noble gesture, but expected no good from it. He wrote to me on September 15 (I was then in Prague): "The Czechoslovak problem is assuming a dramatic turn. Chamberlain is a fine man! But what good can come from a meeting between a businesslike British gentleman and a mad German who is no gentleman?"

Later he said that it had made him literally ill to think of Chamberlain negotiating with Hitler. He regarded the Munich agreement as a great calamity and approved wholeheartedly of the resignation of Eden and Duff Cooper. He told me that in his opinion France and England should have faced Hitler then and there with a break of diplomatic relations over Czechoslovakia. On returning to Belgrade, he wrote to me on November 4:

The final collapse of Czechoslovakia and the wiping out of Subcarpathian Russia are the inevitable outcome of Chamberlain's foolish policy, all the

harmfulness of which has now come to light with complete and shattering clarity. There is one good point in this outcome, and this is that it has dealt a crushing blow to the stupid and infamous Hitlerophilism of the Russian emigration.

Next spring, after Hitler's entry into Prague, the chances of a peaceful solution of the conflict appeared very slim to him. He wrote to me from Belgrade on March 18:

Political events have fully confirmed my point of view and my estimate of the situation given last September. You must admit this. The best thing would be for Chamberlain to retire *of his own accord*. I think that if Daladier holds out he will do so only by sacrificing Bonnet. But the chances of a peaceful outcome have dwindled greatly. The only way out in this respect is in utmost resolution and a very sharp tone. This is just a psychological truth.

A little later, on March 26, he gave his estimate of the world situation with great clarity and perspicacity in a long letter addressed to a prominent British statesman. Many passages in this letter have a prophetic ring and are—*mutatis mutandis*—applicable to the crisis through which the world is passing now and which in so many ways recalls the fateful years preceding World War II.

The civilised world (said Struve in that letter) had never before faced such a difficult and delicate situation. Modern democracies were confronted with the triple danger of (1) individual psychosis, or insanity; (2) mass psychosis; and (3) the national will of a civilized people which fell victim to that double psychosis. Hitler personally was a madman suffering from a combination of a psychopathic belief in his mission with psychopathic mendacity. He was victim of a disease which British psychiatrists describe as moral insanity, with an admixture of what the French call *folie raisonnée*. But this individual insanity would not be so dangerous if it were not coupled with mass psychosis. For National-Socialism was a mass psychosis in which the ideological and emotional elements of Socialism were combined with nationalism and carried to the point of morbidity. The mass psychosis of National-Socialism chose for its leader a psychotic. This was dangerous in itself, but it would be easier for mankind to rid itself of this double calamity if those two psychoses had not succeeded in securing, unbeknown to the rest of the world, a hold on the national will of a great civilized people. It was only in conjunction with the national will of Germany that the individual and mass psychosis could give rise to National-Socialism as a universal danger. The only way of fighting that danger successfully was to distinguish and separate the three factors which went

into its making, and in so doing to make use of the third, and healthy, factor and try to turn it into an ally in combating the two morbid factors.

Italy (continued Struve) was only a by-product of the German factor. It was only after becoming one of the ends of the famous Axis that Fascist Italy was also turned into a world danger. Before that, Fascism was a purely Italian phenomenon. Hitler and National-Socialism had infected Mussolini and Fascism and linked them indissolubly with Germany.

The usual allegation that international relations should not be viewed as a clash between two hostile and irreconcilable ideologies, and the attempt to dismiss this conception of events, the only true one, with a banal reference to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, showed a failure to grasp the real nature of the world crisis. The successive forcible annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia by Hitler were nothing else but an interference in the affairs of other states through demoralization by systematic revolutionary propaganda and revolutionary struggle organised from inside with a view to ultimate external intervention. There was no need for Germany's adversaries to apply the same methods to her, but it was necessary to understand clearly the nature of the world conflict—a clash between two essentially incompatible ways of life. To think that the two could be formally reconciled by the proverbial formula of "non-intervention" was an historical illusion. The Western democracies had to understand that without overcoming inwardly the principles underlying the totalitarian régimes it would be impossible either to avoid a second world war or to carry it to a victorious conclusion. Any concessions to the demands of the totalitarian states were dangerous and could become fatal inasmuch as they freed the national will in those countries from all normal checks and restraints and handed them over to the power of individual and mass psychosis. Therein lay the lesson of Munich—it had greatly enhanced, both in the leaders and in the masses of the totalitarian countries, their sense of impunity.

One fundamental conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis was that even as far as international relations were concerned, the internal structure of a given state was of decisive importance. The apparent exception from this rule was the Soviet Union. The Soviet problem had to be approached with utmost caution, especially in the light of the Germano-Italian danger hanging over the

world. But for a proper understanding of the world crisis it was necessary to realise that the starting-point of that crisis had to be sought in the Russian Revolution in its international aspect. The point was not—important though this was in itself—that as a result of the war of 1914-18, Russia fell out of the number of forces determining the course of world policies. More important was the fact that ideologically speaking, Lenin-Stalin (it was both right and necessary to hyphen those two names) with their Bolshevik régime, and Hitler and Mussolini with their régimes, represented, despite all differences of tactics and even of visible political aims, not only kindred but actually identical phenomena. "Lenin begat Hitler and hitlerised Mussolini." The understanding of this fundamental truth did not provide tactical lines of action for the spring of 1939, but it outlined the main strategical perspective in the great world crisis. The essence of this crisis consisted in the overcoming by the world of the temptations of coercive (revolutionary) Socialism in all its forms, degrees, and directions. But to grasp this truth was important also from the psychological and tactical point of view. The alliance of the Anglo-Franco-American world with the Russian Bolsheviks in a struggle against Hitler and Mussolini would not only weaken the Western combination, but might ultimately bring about its defeat from inside and, if not its final destruction, at least an altogether incalculable disruption in the civilized world based on the rule of law.

Struve then summarized his view of the situation as follows:

1. The idea that the danger of the ideological and political poison contained in the aggressive, totalitarian states can be averted by international concessions, and by concessions in general, is an illusion.
2. The nature of this poison is in substance identical with the Bolshevik poison of the Soviet régime.
3. The only way of combating this poison is by appealing to the inner forces of human society, both in the democracies themselves and in the totalitarian states to which the U.S.S.R. also belongs by its very nature. . . .
4. Therefore, the main task in the fight against Hitlerism and Fascism is a close study and a tactical utilisation of the imminent inner processes in the totalitarian states. Such an attention to those processes does not at all mean an interference, in the banal sense, in the internal affairs of the totalitarian states. But it would be a fatal illusion to believe that the world crisis could be overcome otherwise than by far-reaching inner-political changes in the totalitarian states, in other words by the downfall of coercive Socialism in all its forms. Behind Hitler's back, Communism is lurking, and Stalin is preparing to take over the legacy which is being prepared for him by Hitler.
5. The greatest and the most dangerous illusion of all would therefore be an

alliance between the Western democracies and the Soviet régime which represents the most dangerous and poisonous variety of totalitarian state based on the rule of a single ideology and a single party, effected by means of political coercion.

6. At present, the only possible and right attitude for the democratic countries to take—both politically and practically speaking—is a consistent and uncompromising negation of the very principle of party rule in the State, together with all the anti-legal inferences and applications of this principle in foreign policy (in this respect the non-recognition of Germany's annexation of Czechoslovakia is an historical and political necessity). . . .

Here the situation was diagnosed with great perspicacity. And at the same time how applicable are some of those points to the situation today!

The war did not come to Struve unexpectedly; as early as May 16, 1939, he wrote to me: "It is impossible to forecast the deadline of the *dénouement*, but I do not see what other way out of the situation there can be except a war."

From the outset, the war appeared to him as something more than an ordinary intra-national conflict. On October 19, 1939, he wrote: "It is ridiculous to see the present conflict as *merely* an external war. It is a war of ideas and régimes."

In the same letter he asked me to send him the copy of the London *Times* in which was printed a long letter of H. G. Wells, adding:

It is a striking expression of the folly with which a considerable section of Western European public opinion is infected. Have you read this letter? I should like to reply to it, for in it, as in a focus, are gathered all the fallacies of the so-called "advanced" British and French political thought.

Early in the spring of 1940, my father conceived an idea of a book about the second World War. It was to be interpreted as a twofold conflict: between Germany and the British Empire, and between Democracy and Cheiocracy (he used this term, coined by Polybius, to embrace both Bolshevism and National-Socialism). The book was to be both an historical and a political analysis of the world conflict and of its roots and causes, and at the same time a re-statement of the eternal values of Liberalism. One of the ideas of the book was that in our days, contrary to Ranke's theory and Bismarck's practice, the key to international policies was to be sought in the problems of internal politics. The ultimate outcome of the world conflict, which had begun with the first World War, appeared to Struve as a crisis of Socialism and the downfall of Communism, and the final triumph of Liberalism in its renovated democratic and social aspect. He intended to have the book published in England

and wanted to ask the Dutch Premier, M. Colijn, whom he regarded as the most outstanding contemporary statesman in Europe, to write a preface to it. The introduction and the first chapter of this book were completed in May, 1940, and were apparently mailed to me but never reached me. The draft manuscript has evidently perished in Belgrade, and I possess only the synopsis of the book.

Of the outcome of the war itself, Struve never had the slightest doubt. On May 31, 1940, shortly before the downfall of France, he wrote me: ". . . We have an unshaken confidence in the final triumph of the British Empire and France in their gigantic struggle for liberty and humanity."

And again, on June 9, during the darkest days for Europe: "I have an unshaken and complete confidence in the final and complete victory of the British Empire and France, and nothing could destroy this confidence, based as it is on my whole knowledge as economist, sociologist, and politician."

Letters exchanged by us became more and more infrequent after Hitler's conquest of Western Europe, though we continued to correspond almost to the very day when the Germans invaded Yugoslavia. On March 18, 1941, my father wrote me: "I am still more confident than before (if that is possible, for such has always been my conviction) of the victory of Great Britain. Only now this victory will be even accelerated."

And a week later, on March 25, shortly after Yugoslavia had finally yielded to German demands and two days before the anti-German coup d'état in Belgrade:

Of the changes in the political situation in non-belligerent countries you know better and more than I do. I do not attach any importance to these changes for the outcome of the struggle which, according to my firm conviction, is pre-determined by the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon world over the "totalitarians" in every respect.

This was the last letter received by me from my father. Ten days later, the Germans invaded Yugoslavia, and a month or so after that my father was arrested by the Gestapo. He remained under arrest, first in Belgrade and then in Graz (Austria), for about two months. Released in July, 1941, he returned to Belgrade and spent there another year in conditions of great hardship. Twice he and his wife applied for permission to join their sons in Paris, and twice it was refused by the Germans. Finally, in the summer of 1942, the permission was granted and they moved to Paris. There he died in

February, 1944, his confidence in the final victory of the Western democracies, which was never shaken during the darkest hours of the war, fully confirmed by the course of events. Before his death, he clearly saw the approaching liberation of Europe, but he was not to live to see it happen.

To the very last he also hoped that what he regarded as the "healthy" elements of Germany would attempt a coup against Hitler. Those who were in touch with Struve in the last months of his life know that he actually predicted the *Putsch* of July 20, 1944. But he did not foresee that it would end in a failure.

Georgi Ivanov—Paragon of Verse

By LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY

IT happened at Biarritz in the autumn of 1945. The beautiful French coastal city on the Bay of Biscay was practically taken over by American soldiers. One of them, a Harvard Ph.D. and former instructor at that university, sought out some Russians for the purpose of conversing in their language. He met a lady who introduced him to her husband, saying: "This is the foremost Russian poet of today." The American soldier beheld a lanky middle-aged man with a long sallow face and a thick drooping lower lip from the corner of which hung a cigarette. He was Georgi Vladimirovich Ivanov—the Russian Théophile Gautier, one of the best contemporary Russian poets and the last of the acmeists.

Born in St. Petersburg in 1894 of a well-to-do cultured family, he received his education in a school for military cadets in his native city, but after graduating substituted the sound of the lyre to that of the saber. His Scotch ancestry was reflected by a longing for the land of lochs and bogs, of heaths covered with heather and of medieval castles shrouded in mist. He even exclaimed in one of his poems: "And bless, oh! Lord, this Scotland mine."

While still in school he began writing verse and, after a few of his compositions were published, he made the acquaintance of some leading poets of the time, such as Alexander Blok, Mikhail Kuzmin, and Sergei Gorodetsky. In the spring of 1911, he joined the ego-futurists headed by Igor Severyanin and the next year published under their auspices his first collection of verse entitled *Departure to the Island of Cythera*. The book was very favorably received by the critics. Bryusov wrote in *The Russian Thought*:

There are "promises" in the verses of Mr. Georgi Ivanov although he is not yet independent in his art and finds himself still under the influence of his predecessors, particularly of M. Kuzmin. He knows how to maintain his style throughout a poem; he finds at times daintily graceful expressions ("The moon arose as in Verlaine's verse"), but so far he did not contribute anything independently original. As all young poets, Mr. Ivanov is most successful in the descriptions of nature.¹

This was indeed praise from the pen of such a recognized master as

¹Valery Bryusov, "Segodnyashnii den russkoi poezii," *Russkaya Mysl*, July 1912, pp. 21-22.

Bryusov, but it was surpassed by Gumilyov's enthusiastic words in *Apollo*:

The first thing which attracts one's attention in the book of Georgi Ivanov is the verse. It is rare among poet-beginners to find it so refined, at times impetuous and rapid, more often just lingering, but always in conformity with the theme of the poem. Therefore, each poem in reading gives an almost physical feeling of satisfaction. When reading on, one can find other important merits: an unquestionable taste displayed even in the boldest attempts; an unexpectedness of themes and a kind of graceful "foolishness" in that measure which was demanded by Pushkin.²

Although the book came out under the imprint of the ego-futurists, one already could find in it the unmistakable influence of the acmeists, especially of Gumilyov, in such poems as "Ghazali," the very form of which was borrowed from the Persian and introduced into Russian poetry by the leader of the acmeists:

I galloped on my steed to thee, oh, love.
My soul was rushing in sweet dreams to thee, oh, love.

I faintly heard the clang of swords and arrows' song
While flying from the fall to spring, to thee, oh, love.

I followed golden Phoebus step by step;
He floated on a fiery fleece to thee, oh, love.

Throughout the night I did not drop the bridle nor dismount,
Confiding in the moon in haste to thee, oh, love.

Surrounded by the foe I was, and cut, and bled,
But still I reached for heights to thee, oh, love.

Bled white I fell upon the crimson snow . . .
I fly, I fly—it seemed to me—to thee, oh, love.

Soon after the publication of his first book, Georgi Ivanov met Gumilyov, deserted his ego-futurists and joined the "Guild of Poets" to become a full-fledged exponent of acmeist ideas and techniques. At that time his life-long friendship with Gumilyov began.

In 1914 Georgi Ivanov published his second book of verse, this time under the auspices of the "Guild of Poets." It was entitled *The Chamber* (*Gornitsa*) and in reviewing it, Gumilyov wrote in *Apollo*²

Georgi Ivanov, author of *The Chamber* has grown up to self-determination. Like Akhmatova, he did not "invent himself," but his verses are unified by the

²N. Gumilyov, "Pisma o russkoi poezii," *Apollon*, 1912, Nos. 3-4, p. 101.

psychology of a saunterer. He does not think in images; I am very much afraid that he does not think at all. But he wants to talk about what he sees and he likes the very art of speech. That is why his assonances sound like rhymes, his free verse like a severe meter. . . . Georgi Ivanov's verse is a combination of epic dryness with the energy of a ballad.³

There was another characteristic in Georgi Ivanov's poetry. His descriptions in minute detail of books, of etchings, of a bead-embroidered tobacco pouch, of vases containing flowers or fruit, of a coffee-set, etc., tended to create poetical "still-life" as if his pen were changed to a paint brush.

A coffee-pot, a sugar bowl and saucers,
Five cups adorned with a narrow band
Press close together on a tray of azure
And their numb tale I fully understand.

or

There is in lithographs of ancient masters
An oft inexplicable, but an obvious life.

When the first World War broke out and Gumilyov volunteered for military service, Georgi Ivanov at the age of twenty replaced him as a critic of poetry on the staff of the *Apollo*. And he proved to be an astute and penetrating critic. In his first major article devoted to war poetry he wrote:

The war broke the stuffy circle of individualism and gave birth to broad common interests. Russian poetry regained its innate right to be the people's voice, whereas in the last few years, one must confess, each poet was at best only the voice of a narrow circle of his readers and friends. And it is symptomatic that the voices of elders began to sound with youthful vigor, that poets who seemed to have become silent forever started to write again and anew. . . . The war verses of our poets are not only a simple echo of events which move everyone, they bear in themselves signs, feeble as yet, but obvious, nevertheless, of a genuine re-birth of our senile modernism. All half-impressions, all half-tones, all vagueness and hesitancy have disappeared instantly as if from the touch of a magic wand. Sadness and joy, ecstasy, and wrath—simple words and clear feelings have replaced the boring antics of poets over-satisfied with themselves. Our poetry has been cleansed by a wave of beautiful vigor, of sober and joyful enthusiasm.⁴

And, indeed, Russian war poetry followed the acmeist precepts of clarity, vigor, and simplicity.

Georgi Ivanov himself contributed some war poems permeated with deep religious feeling similar to that expressed by Anna Akhmatova.

³Gumilyov, "Pismo o russkoi poezii," *Apollon*, 1914, No. 5, pp. 39-40.

⁴Georgi Ivanov, "Ispytanie ognym," *Apollon*, 1914, No. 8, p. 53.

tova. They were published in a collection entitled *The Monument of Glory*. (*Pamyatnik Slavy*), but unlike those of Gumilyov they did not glorify war, and soon Ivanov returned to his familiar themes. In 1916 he published a new collection of verse, *Heather* (*Veresk*), of which the first part was a reprint of *The Chamber*, which then was out of print. In *Heather* there is a reflection of the acmeists' attraction to the classicism and pseudo-classicism of the eighteenth century, as Georgi Ivanov exclaims:

Oh, imitators of Watteau, dressed up like marquises—
You, Russian noblemen—I love your country-bred Versailles.

In a review of this book in *Apollo*, Gumilyov wrote:

Heather has an all-embracing aim—a desire to perceive and to express the world as a change of visual images. . . . In his new poems Georgi Ivanov reveals himself as an able master of verse as well as a sharp observer. He knows how to create a whole from a number of small details and then to indicate his own attitude toward it by the movement of his verse. . . . Georgi Ivanov's poems charm one by their warm attraction to objects and by their unconditional, at first glance, though limited existence.⁵

When the revolution came, Georgi Ivanov remained outside of it, although the loss of his independent income forced him to accept for a while a minor position in one of the Soviet government institutions. It was then—in the spring of 1918—that I recall him particularly at a poetical matinée in Petrograd at which he read his poetry in a singing, swaying voice, almost resembling that of a somnambulist. Tall, thin, with his hair in bangs covering most of his forehead, with his protruding Bourbon-like lower lip and half-closed eyes he did appear as if in a dream when he read:

In the middle of September
Cold and changeable is the weather.
Skies are like a curtain. And nature
Is full of theatrical splendor.
Every stone, every blade of grass,
Which under the wind is moving,
Like one out of Maeterlinck's plays,
In wonderful whispers says:

—I love thee, I love and die . . .
—Like wax, like smoke is my heart . . .
—Oh, soon to a new blue sky
—With swans we shall also depart . . .

⁵Gumilyov, "Pismo," *Apollon*, 1916, No. 1, pp. 27-28.

In autumn when the eyes are mist,
 When thoughts are confusion, the heart is ice—
 Sweet 'tis to listen to this dying tryst
 While gazing at the stagnant water's bice.
 And sweet 'tis to walk o'er the yellow rug
 With the head so light and ready to spin,
 Absent minded to light a match in the wind
 And to throw it away with a shrug.

That poetical matinée, held in the hall of the Tennishev school, was marked by an incident which should not pass unrecorded in the annals of Russian literature of the time. Alexander Blok had only recently published his famous poem "The Twelve," in which he compared twelve soldiers of the Red Guard to the twelve apostles of Christ. At this matinée, the actress Bassargina of the Alexandrinsky Theater recited the poem for the first time in public. It produced a mixed effect on the audience; one half of them applauded vigorously, while the other half followed the performance with catcalls and other forms of disapproval. The hall was in a pandemonium, and Blok was scheduled then to read his poems. Pale, trembling, he refused to go on the stage. It was then that Nicholas Gumilyov said to him: "You wrote it, Alexander Alexandrovich, and you should have the courage to accept the consequences. But it would have been better had you not written it at all." Thereupon, Gumilyov walked on the stage, and, having quieted the audience by his commanding personality, read his poetry, thus making it possible for Blok to appear later without any hostile manifestations.

In the years following the Revolution, Georgi Ivanov participated in the brief revival of the "Guild of Poets" started upon the initiative of Gumilyov. And after the latter was executed in 1921, he edited Gumilyov's posthumous collection of poems as well as his critical essays on poetry which had appeared in *Apollo*. His poetical talent grew in those years. In 1921 he published a new book of verse entitled *Gardens (Sady)*. Commenting on it in the *Contemporary Annals*, the well-known critic, K. Mochulsky, wrote:

The plastic principle of contemporary poetry is developed to the fullest extent in Georgi Ivanov's collection *Gardens*. . . . Georgi Ivanov's poetry is exclusively graphic and picturesque. He lives in the world of lines and color. . . . Only well established artistic forms appeal to his imagination. . . . Even nature is conceived by the poet as a work of art, as a colorful theatrical scenery.⁶

A year later, Georgi Ivanov published the first volume of his

⁶Mochulsky, "Klassitsizm," pp. 378-379.

collected verse under the title *Lamp Before an Ikon* (*Lampada*). In addition to poems previously published, this book also contained new ones among which is this remarkable octave:

A smile—it's the same and always,
Immovable are the dry lips.
Such as thou stand guard at the gates
To the heaven of Apocalypse.

And only when the eyelashes
Fling themselves open, eyes look out.
And it seems as if dark birds hover
And a storm is raging about.

In a review of this book the Soviet critic and poet, Innokenty Oksyonov, wrote:

Georgi Ivanov must be placed in the category of poets of a purely plastic type. . . . A world of subdued, melancholy colors, half-deteriorated old etchings, the architectural grandeur of St. Petersburg—all of these pass before the reader's eyes in light, masterfully composed verses. . . . Georgi Ivanov's inspiration has almost always as its source some work of art.⁷

Such words remind one of his kinship to Osip Mandelstam, whose poetry was not a direct reflection of life, but rather a reflection of its reflection in art.

In 1922 Georgi Ivanov left Russia for Paris never to return. And although emigration has often stilted the creative abilities of many writers, particularly of poets, Georgi Ivanov's talent grew and matured. With the passing of years, his vocabulary became more terse, his verse more precise. Always a good craftsman, Georgi Ivanov's chiselled verse now warranted his being called the Russian Théophile Gautier.

In 1931 he published a new collection of poetry entitled *Roses*, in which his monosyllabic style surpasses even that of Akhmatova. By an agglomeration and repetition of epithets he creates a feeling which is disturbing, vaguely sinister, when he says:

Space is sad, clear, cold, dark,
Cold, clear, sad.

In reviewing this book, Mochulsky said: "Before *Roses*, Georgi Ivanov was a fine master, an exquisite versifier, who wrote 'charming' and 'enchanted' verse. In *Roses* he has become a poet."⁸

⁷*Kniga i Revolyutsiya*, 1922, No. 7 (19), p. 62.

⁸K. Mochulsky, "Rosy. Stikhi Georgiya Ivanova," *Sovremennyya Zapiski*, 1931, XLVI, 502.

But it was not until the publication of his latest collection of selected verse, for which he chose the title of his first collection, *Departure to the Island of Cythera*, that he revealed himself as an accomplished master of form and content.

When reading *Departure* we understand—in the fullest meaning of this word—that which was only faintly felt by us. How is this achieved? In what does this mysterious action of poetry consist? Of course only in one thing—in the penetration into the mystery of the word, which consists in some kind of undeniable, though inexplicable, connection between its “outer” and “inner” form. The reality of poetry is an irrefutable testimony of the existence of this connection. . . . In the use of the rhythmic structure of words and of word combinations, Georgi Ivanov reveals his unquestioned mastery.⁹

What was still only an indication of his style in *Roses*, is now fully revealed. Georgi Ivanov has the capacity of creating an eerie, out-of-this-world effect by the use of simple words in a seemingly endless and repetitious variation.

Only stars. And the blue air,
Blue into eternity.
Blue and fearful, starry-blue
Over thee and over me.

Applying this technique to a modern theme, he turns his gaze toward Russia and produces one of the most soul-rendering poems about that martyred, unhappy land:

Russia is gladness. Russia is light.
Or is there any Russia in this night?

And o'er the Neva the north sun didn't set,
And Pushkin on the snow was never dead?

Yes, there's no Petersburg and Kremlin oft rebuilt,
But only snow and snow, and field and field. . . .

Snow, snow and snow. . . . And night is long.
And never will there come a spring along.

Snow, snow and snow. . . . And night is dark.
And never will a dawn its ending mark.

Russia is stillness. Russia is dust.
Or is now Russia only fear, mistrust?

A rope, a bullet—all in icy gloom,
And music sending mind and soul to doom.

⁹P. Bitsilli, “Georgi Ivanov. Otplytie na ostrov Tsiteru,” *Sovremennyya Zapiski*, 1937, LXIV, 458, 459.

A rope, a bullet, and a convict's dawn
O'er that for which no designation's drawn.

In these poems as in his present poetry, Georgi Ivanov combines the femininity of feeling of Anna Akhmatova and the masculinity of form of Nicholas Gumilyov—the two pillars of acmeism. In addition to poetry, he published in recent years a book of delightful literary reminiscences, *St. Petersburg Winters*, a Joycean book of introspective analysis of contemporary man, *Disintegration of the Atom*, contributed numerous articles of literary criticism to Russian and French publications, and edited Gumilyov's book of verse, *Foreign Skies*, as a memorial to the founder of acmeism on the fifteenth anniversary of the poet's death. Ivanov remains today not only the outstanding representative of acmeism, the movement which contributed so much to the regeneration of Russian poetry before the Revolution, and which is now banned in the Soviet Union, but also an accomplished poet, an able craftsman, a fine master, a true paragon of verse.

Book Reviews

CRANKSHAW, EDWARD. *Russia and the Russians*. New York, The Viking Press, 1948. 223 pp. \$3.00.

Some of the confusion which the reader feels about the nature of Mr. Crankshaw's latest book may well come from the fact that while the publisher presents it as "objective," the author describes himself as "an imaginative writer." The two positions are not always reconcilable. Mr. Crankshaw was presumably being imaginative rather than objective when he wrote: of the peasants seizing the land on Lenin's instructions (p. 69); of the German sympathies of Alexandra (p. 93); of the attempt by Kerensky to set up a system "essentially against the people" (p. 95); and of the intention of the Provisional Government not to let the peasants have the land (p. 97). Nor is there much objectivity in his failure to recognize that the Bolshevik efforts toward World Revolution were one of the major causes for the Allied interventions. Mr. Crankshaw's summary of this early period of Soviet history leaves much to be desired.

One may also complain that his insistence upon "The Plain and History" smacks too heavily of thesis-history. Geography was and remains one of the determinants of human life and action but, as Mr. Crankshaw recognizes in a sentence, not the only one. And despite that sentence, he insists that: "The main natural circumstance is the nature of the plain which the Russians inhabit. The main historical circumstance, itself deriving from the plain, was the Mongol conquest." As he himself remarks, "Life is not so simple as all that" (p. 53).

Mr. Crankshaw is at his best when dealing with Lenin, and with the contrasting natures of Communism and Democracy. His best, it should at once be said, is very good indeed. In these matters he returns from imagination to a clear perception of objective realities. This judgment will not find favor with those who idolize and idealize Lenin. Take, for example, the following passages.

"Stalin may be often rough and sometimes clumsy, but as far as principles go, he has not betrayed his master. And the point that I am trying to make is that it is no good sentimentalizing over Lenin and condemning the present régime. They stand or fall together. For nothing could have been less free and flexible than the ideals of Lenin, whose rigidity of mind was absolute, and who went, and would have gone again and again, to any lengths that he dared to bring those ideals to swifter fulfillment" (p. 106).

". . . when he considered it necessary to be unyielding, the rigidity of Lenin was absolute and . . . the cruel eclecticism of his successor is not a Stalin specialty but the inevitable development of Leninism" (p. 113).

Equally penetrating and realistic is Mr. Crankshaw's analysis of the nature of the struggle between Communism and "Capitalism." He sees clearly what so many analysts and all wishful and confused liberals miss: namely, the significance of the Marxist-Leninist theories as guides to Soviet action. The tactical lines developed from this often change, but the fundamentals do not. "There is no room for compromise in the Marxian religion which is based on a

'natural law' . . . " (p. 116). In spite of the oft-quoted statements of Stalin about the possibility of cooperation between the two systems, there is an abundance of much more impressive evidence to warrant Mr. Crankshaw's conclusion that the two are basically incompatible.

Does this mean war now? Mr. Crankshaw believes that Russia would prefer not to fight now. Does it mean a future war? He thinks not, although he recognizes the possibility as real. Russia, he says, exists. "We can ignore it; it will overwhelm us. We can seek to destroy it; we shall destroy ourselves. We can throw ourselves into its arms; it will absorb us with scarcely a trace . . . the only answer . . . is that our whole conception of society . . . will have to be remodeled to allow for this new and unprecedented fact [of Russia]" (p. 222). Well and good. But Mr. Crankshaw neglects to tell us how. "We have," he concludes, "to ask what happens now." We do, indeed!

WARREN B. WALSH

Syracuse University

GRAY, G. D. B. *Soviet Land, the Country, Its People, and Their Work*. London, Adam and Charles Black, 1947. (N. Y. Macmillan). 324 pp. \$3.00.

Soviet Land is a useful contribution to our understanding of the Russian landscape but it is clear that the author, G. D. B. Gray, is favorably disposed toward the achievements of the Soviets. In this particular, the book's 1947 date reflects British wartime appreciation of the contribution of their ally. Like most books on the

U.S.S.R. this one is inevitably disappointing because verification is impossible. At innumerable points the critical reader will wonder as to the authority for the statement presented. There are no citations of Soviet sources, nor supporting documentation. Many of the 150 maps and diagrams are excellent, and while their source is not given, several appear to be based on the Great Soviet World Atlas. Many of the 75 photographs are new, but, unfortunately, they are not too well reproduced.

The book is uneven in value. Straightforward factual material on agriculture, industry, and people is mixed with unnecessarily long treatises on the principles of glaciation and soil formation. There is no serious geographic philosophy behind the presentation. Mr. Gray has travelled widely, and the book is frequently enriched by his direct observations.

Soviet Land is divided into three parts; the country, the people, and their work. Separate chapters deal with location, physical features, climate, soil and vegetation, government, history, agriculture, industry, transport, and settlement. These represent the various systematic aspects of geography, but there is no regional presentation as such. *Soviet Land* has the merit of considering the country as a whole rather than as though it were broken into European and Asiatic halves.

In general the data are those of 1938, but in several cases material has been added as to wartime developments. Here is a comprehensive picture of the resources, achievements, and geographic potentials of the U.S.S.R. All students of the country will wish to have this volume for frequent reference but it

should be used in connection with the standard text by Gregory and Shave, and that of the reviewer; and the exuberant contributions of Mikhailov.

GEORGE B. CRESSEY
Syracuse University

WOLFE, BERTRAM D. *Three Who Made A Revolution*. New York, Dial Press, 1948. 661 pp. \$5.00.

This carefully documented, in places brilliantly written, volume is indispensable to those who wish to understand the Russian Bolshevik Revolution. Through a biographical study of the three leaders—Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin—Mr. Wolfe skillfully reconstructs the intricate struggle of ideas among Russian Marxists in the three decades preceding the Bolshevik seizure of power.

Mr. Wolfe is admirably equipped for the task. He has been a student of Russian affairs for some thirty years. He met Stalin, Trotsky, Molotov, and many other personages who appear in the book, attended international Communist Congresses in Moscow and, in general, displays an exceptional grasp of Russian history and institutions. The present volume is the product of ten years of labor.

The chapter, "The Heritage," is a brilliant exposition of Russia's historical development. In it the author rightly stresses the peculiarities of Russian geography; the split in the Russian psyche as a result of forced Europeanization; the prodigious growth of state capitalism in the nineteenth century; the unwieldy apparatus of the Tsarist bureaucracy. He seems

right to this reviewer when he considers the unevenness of internal change (rather than stagnation) and the ineptitude of the ruling class as causal factors in the downfall of the old régime. Change was widely recognized as necessary, he says, but the last Romanovs were "unable to lead the nation boldly along the new uncharted ways, until at last the autocracy ceased to show signs of further adaptability, becoming the rallying center of opposition change." Again, much of the revolutionary movement in the second half of the nineteenth century, he rightly characterizes by extreme fanaticism and dogmatism. "Heresy or rival doctrine was worse than ignorance; it was apostasy." The three professional revolutionaries who "made" the Revolution had all this as their heritage.

The Bolshevik Revolution was largely Lenin's work, and the bulk of the book is properly devoted to him. The key to Lenin's personality is in the following statement of Ignazio Silone which Mr. Wolfe quotes: "The fact that all his powers and energies were concentrated upon one thing makes it easy for him to appear extraordinary in the eyes of the masses and become a leader, in the same way that those who really concentrate on God become saints and those who live only for money become millionaires." Lenin towered above all his contemporaries not only because of his commanding abilities, but because of his complete absorption in the Revolution.

In the ideological war between the Marxists and Populists and later between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, Lenin was completely ruthless; he stopped at nothing to demolish his opponents' views. Vera Zasulich once said to Lenin that

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Plekhanov was a greyhound "he shakes and shakes his adversary, then lets go. But you, you are a bulldog; you have a deadly bite." In all his polemics, Lenin never let go.

Mr. Wolfe shows that Lenin's dislike of Russian liberals could be traced to his childhood when, after the execution of his elder brother, the local liberal intelligentsia would have nothing to do with the Lenin family. He also rightly establishes the connection between Lenin's political ideology and strategy with some of the late nineteenth century Russian revolutionaries, notably Tkachev and Bakunin.

Lenin's conception of an exclusive, highly centralized party organization is at the root of the modern, one-party totalitarian state. This comes out forcibly in Mr. Wolfe's book, yet the author never quite draws this conclusion. Speaking of Lenin's polemic on the National Question, Mr. Wolfe finds it possible to say that "up to his seizure of power in 1917, Lenin always remained by conviction a democrat, however much his temperament and will and the organizational structure of his party may have conflicted with his democratic convictions." On the basis of Mr. Wolfe's own testimony and that of other biographers, one would be inclined to make a different conclusion: that Lenin was a "democrat" only when the exigencies of propaganda or his polemics required it. His was an authoritarian mind, and by temperament and by conviction he seemed devoid of democratic and humanitarian sentiments.

Speaking of Lenin's *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*, which had hardly attracted any attention at the time of its appearance, Mr. Wolfe shows how in time this book

had become the basic text, the scripture of present day Russia. "On the exegesis by Lenin has been superimposed an exegesis of the exegesis by Stalin." Thus a rigid state faith or state philosophy has been developed.

In the chapters on Trotsky, Mr. Wolfe helps to restore the historical rôle of Trotsky in the Russian Social Democratic movement. Speaking of Trotsky's early activities as a labor organizer, Mr. Wolfe quotes one of his colleagues, Dr. Ziv, who was never among Trotsky's admirers: "The lion's share of the success of the new organization [in the south of Russia] we owed unquestionably to Bronstein [Trotsky], whose inexhaustible energy, skill in plans and contrivances of all sorts, and resistance to fatigue had no limits." During the *Iskra* period, Trotsky's name was already well known to the rank and file of the Party, but he achieved national fame as the principal organizer of the St. Petersburg Soviet and of the general strike of 1905. Trotsky was then 26 years old and "the outstanding figure of the Soviet, he was writing all the most admirable documents on the spur of the moment, preparing all the most welcome motions, making the most moving speeches, doing much of the quick thinking that guided the life of the Soviet in the face of kaleidoscopic change." Lenin himself said that he earned his reputation among Social Democrats "by his tireless and striking work."

Mr. Wolfe recalls Trotsky's brilliant prophesy regarding Lenin's celebrated centralism: "The organization of the Party takes the place of the Party itself, the Central Committee takes the place of the organization; and finally the dic-

tator takes the place of the Central Committee." One wonders, however, whether the situation would have been any different, had Trotsky succeeded in maintaining the leadership of the Party.

Trotsky may well have been the most brilliant of the three as Mr. Wolfe's testimony seems to show. Yet he undoubtedly lacked the will power and the elemental force of Lenin or Stalin. His arrogance, egocentrism, and theatricality were qualities that never made him popular within the inner circle of the Party and eventually led to his downfall after Lenin's death.

"It should be clear to the reader," says Mr. Wolfe in introducing Stalin, "that we are dealing with the most striking example in all history of a man who has succeeded in inventing himself." Of the three, Stalin's biography is the hardest to unravel. It is beset by obscurities and contradictions. Many important historical accounts by contemporaries have long since been banned and destroyed. Mr. Wolfe attempts the almost impossible: the reconstruction of the first thirty years of Stalin's life in remote Georgia. He carefully collates the official works on Stalin with the existing critical accounts of him, leaving the reader to make his own conclusions. A great deal of stress is laid on Stalin's Asiatic origin and background.

One of the most obscure points of Stalin's biography is his rôle in the Bolshevik organizations in Transcaucasia. Mr. Wolfe brings considerable evidence to show that Stalin's rôle was much more modest than is shown in his official biographies by Enukidze and Beria. Similarly, he reduces Stalin's importance as the editor of early *Pravda*.

In 1905, Trotsky had attained nation-wide prominence; Stalin was unknown. In succeeding years the names of Lenin and Trotsky were frequently linked together, though they frequently disagreed on political and organizational matters. Mr. Wolfe shows that the many distortions of history by Stalin's biographers were largely undertaken "to bury the memory of the duality Lenin-Trotsky."

"As writer, as author, as theoretician, Stalin was and remains a mediocrity. But first as a subordinate part in Lenin's machine, then as an appropriator and transformer and enlarger of that machine, Stalin has few equals." Mr. Wolfe admits that Trotsky, as much as Stalin, was a product of Lenin's machine and that by finally accepting that machine, Trotsky "reduced himself from the rôle of a genuine critic of 'Stalinism' to that of a pretender denouncing a usurper." Curiously enough—in view of subsequent history—Mr. Wolfe considers that one of Stalin's major contributions to the Bolshevik Revolution was his urging of the acceptance of the peasants' demand in 1917 for partition instead of nationalization of land, thus making the peasantry neutral to the régime for a time.

Besides the biographical studies of the three who prepared and later carried out the Bolshevik coup d'état, Mr. Wolfe's book contains a wealth of material on Plekhanov, Martov, Axelrod, and other important figures of Russian Marxism. Although the author makes apparent his condemnation of Stalin's dictatorship, he shows, on the whole, a remarkable impartiality in evaluating personalities and events. The volume ends somewhat abruptly with the outbreak of World War I.

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Students of the Russian Revolution will look forward to Mr. Wolfe's next volume which will carry his story beyond the year 1917.

DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT
Dartmouth College

MAYNARD, SIR JOHN. *Russia in Flux*. New York, Macmillan, 1948. 564 pp. \$6.50.

The present volume, an abridgement and combination of material published in England as two books, is basically a collection of essays on various aspects of Russian and Soviet life. About half the book is devoted to an interpretive—and sometimes impressionistic—analysis of Soviet economic history, with some emphasis upon the position of the peasantry before and after 1917. The second half consists of essays dealing mainly with the intellectual history of Russia and the U.S.S.R., but also covering such topics as Soviet policy toward religion and non-Russian nationalities, and the Constitution of 1936.

Let it be said at the outset that this reviewer disagrees sharply with Sir Bernard Pares' judgment that *The Russian Peasant and Other Studies*—the original title under which Maynard's chapters on Soviet economics appeared—is "far and away the best book written in English on the Soviet period." But no reader of Maynard's work could fail to understand the provocation for Pares' praise, since rare is the book so rich in stimulating insights, so obviously the product of a fine mind probing deep to the core of complex matters.

Maynard's view of the Soviet system is distilled from three sources:

his life in England and familiarity with conditions there, his long experience as a British civil servant in India, and his travels in and study of pre- and post-revolutionary Russia. Of these three, this reviewer believes Maynard's understanding of the great poverty which is the lot of most of the population in India was most influential in shaping his judgments of the Soviet scene. To Maynard, the Soviet experiment is a stupendous effort to lift almost two hundred million people out of their age-old morass of hunger and want at a pace incredibly swift. He recognizes the sacrifices, blunders, and inequities accompanying this effort—for Maynard is no naive fellow traveler who knows only the rosier hues of the Soviet scene—but is so stirred by the fact of the effort that he counts the accompanying burdens and losses as a relatively small price to pay for the gains already made and in prospect. What other point of view might we perhaps expect from a sensitive person so intimately acquainted with the mass poverty and resignation to poverty of India?

Maynard's book is, therefore, a useful counter to the studies of others who view Russia against the background of the richer lands to the West without taking adequately into account the poverty in which the great mass of Russians have always lived.

But to this reviewer it also seems that Maynard's interpretation suffers from an overly-optimistic view of the objective and actual accomplishments of the Soviet régime. Thus Maynard believes that collectivization has made farm women independent and put them "on the side of the Soviets." Yet, as Jasni has recently pointed out, the whole

course of Soviet agrarian legislation over the past decade indicates that the Soviet régime has had to use increasingly strong coercion to force women to work on the collective lands rather than on their own garden plots. One wonders whether Maynard would not have sharply modified his analysis of the collective farm if he had lived to learn of the material published by the Soviet government since 1946 on the peasant's aversion to their obligations on the collective farms.

Maynard's contention that the Soviet régime aims "to give freedom of choice to the consumer" and that it should be no more difficult for the state to do so than for private organizations, offers another case in point. Maynard misses the point that in a private enterprise society, the individual producer is ultimately at the mercy of the consumer, though of course the consumer may be influenced through advertising and related techniques. In the Soviet Union, it is the consumer who is at the mercy of the great mass of producers controlled by the state. He buys what is available or does not buy. The whole history of Soviet consumer goods production and distribution is a tale of enormous waste through the production of shoddy goods poorly distributed in relation to demand, a not unnatural result in a society where consumers sovereignty has been replaced by state-planned producer sovereignty.

Maynard's casual treatment of the subject of compulsory labor is perhaps the most disturbing element in his analysis. "Penal labour" he excludes from consideration as belonging to the province of "prison management or criminal adminis-

tration." The charges made against G.P.U. (now M.V.D.) timber camps in Karelia are dismissed on the ground that "a conscript force would not be likely to deal with" timber production satisfactorily. Such cavalier treatment of a basic facet of Soviet society—a facet on which the literature was abundant in Maynard's lifetime, to say nothing of the flood of information that has appeared since his death—suggests a callousness to basic human values which is perhaps understandable in one viewing Russia against the background of India. But it is a callousness which must be borne in mind throughout the book, particularly when we read such passages as "if we desire that kind of liberty which consists in economic security, we must, it would seem, be prepared to sacrifice that kind of liberty which consists in doing what we please at the cost of economic security." The latter kind of liberty is to Maynard "one of the middle class illusions, which do not deceive the man who depends upon the wage of his daily labour."

But perhaps the best answer to Maynard's point of view has been given by the thousands of Soviet citizens who have fled the U.S.S.R. and its jurisdiction during the 1940's. Better than he, they have understood that the choice is not between the grinding poverty of India and the regimented "security" of the U.S.S.R. In that understanding must lie our hope for a brighter future, for the Soviet Union and for the world.

HARRY SCHWARTZ
Syracuse University

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BRIEM, EFRAIM. *Kommunismus und Religion in der Sowjetunion. Ein Ideenkampf*. Translated from the Swedish by Edzard Schaper. Basel, Friedrich Reinhardt AG, 1948. 434 pp. Sfs. 18.50.

Fritz Lieb's book on "Christianity in the Soviet Union" (cf. *Russian Review*, VI, 1 [1946]) has found an early and much needed successor in the late Professor Briem's work on the same topic. Briem begins with an analysis of Marxian doctrinal attitude toward religion; he continues with an analysis of the special conditions of Christianity and the Orthodox Church in Russia; and only after thus having laid a foundation does he proceed to describe the clash of the two in the Soviet Union. The survey of the dogmatic positions of both Church and Marxism in the two introductory chapters contains little that has not been exposed before; but the third and essential part arouses the interest of the reader and holds it to the end.

Professor Briem does not attempt to give a historical account of the by now well-known events in the struggle of the Soviet government with the Church; as promised in the title, he keeps his mind focussed on the *Ideenkampf*. Starting with the declaration of July 13, 1917, which was to serve as a basis for a reconstruction of the Church and which illustrates the pretensions as well as the illusions then still predominant within the Church, Briem develops the struggle on the basis of pertinent and most interestingly selected—and extensively quoted—documents and articles. He deals with the reform movements within the Church and particularly the establishment and decline of the "Living Church." He describes the

tribulations of the Church, gives statistics, and in a scholarly manner takes up the religious persecutions in the fourfold light of reports by foreign observers, Soviet statements, declarations of Orthodox churchmen, and judgments of critics outside of Russia. He discusses the atheist movement, the changing policies of the Church, the various legislations, and the personalities of the leading churchmen.

The whole is an impressively arranged structure. Facts are given, problems raised, and sides are taken. Briem arrives at the conclusion—which may seem dubious—that the struggle has been won by the Soviets. If certain rights have of late been granted to the Church, this happened not out of a new esteem for religion (p.374), nor out of political necessity (p.415), but because "the majority of the population of Russia has completely emancipated itself from religion and is utterly indifferent to whatever is called Church or churchlife" (p.386). "Twenty-five years after the revolution . . . one no longer needs to fight religion in the Soviet state, for religion has in the widest sense ceased to exercise any influence on the youth" (p.388).

Whether or not Briem's conclusions are correct, the copiously documented exposition makes his book a welcome contribution. There is, however, still much room for further investigation. In particular, Briem avoids, like others, making a distinction between "religion," "Christianity," and "Orthodox Church," using these terms interchangeably. Yet, the Communist attitude toward religion—an instrument of exploiters to divert, for their own benefit, man's attention from the evils of this earth

(p.50)—is one thing: Soviet relations with the Orthodox Church—a politically and socially pliable institution—is another. Christianity—teacher of brotherly love and service—is however of a third dimension. Communists cannot view Christianity as an enemy like the Church or religion; it is a heresy. This attitude is, to a certain extent, reciprocated; even Pope Pius XI, in his encyclic *Divini Redemptoris* (p.354), warns against “so-called humanitarian and charitable fields,” in which the Soviets promise to cooperate, and against their “proposals which correspond in all the spirit of Christianity and the teaching of the Church.” For an understanding of the *Ideenkampf* it would seem desirable to analyze also this aspect of the issue.

A 1948 postscript has been added to the book, which appeared in the original Swedish in 1945. It contributes not only an implied criticism, but raises an additional point: the positive use to which the Soviet government has put the Church in the prosecution of its international, particularly Pan-Slav, ambitions. The work thus represents an earnest endeavor to throw light on the various aspects of the vital struggle between religious and materialistic concepts which, from a human point of view, surpasses in importance the frame within which the battle is momentarily fought.

WALTHER KIRCHNER

University of Delaware

KIRCHNER, WALTHER. *An Outline-History of Russia*. New York, Barnes and Noble, 1948. 317 pp. \$1.50.

Within the limited space of this volume, Dr. Kirchner has supplied

us with an admirable condensation of the course of Russian history from earliest times to the present. In the main, the story is told chronologically and, along with the usual material on political events, there are chapters concerning social life, the arts, and the church. For the most part, this has been accomplished with clarity and without distortion or misrepresentation.

This book should prove useful as a teaching tool. Properly used, it will give the student, in a short time and with a minimum of effort, a general view of Russian history which will enable him to appreciate and understand more extensive works.

There is one major omission, however. The author has failed to present a clear summary of the ideas behind the Communist Party. An explanation of the Marxist-Leninist system of thought is essential to an understanding of the events in Russia since the 1917 Revolution. He often refers to “Marxian teachings,” “socialist goals,” and the like, but he does not explain just what these teachings are or where they came from.

Each chapter is preceded by a short list of events and dates, and is followed by a few questions for the student. The volume contains some helpful maps and a useful chronological table which includes events in general, European and American, as well as Russian, history.

The bibliography appended to the volume is rather inadequate. It is hard to understand the complete omission of such authors as S. N. Harper, G. B. Cressey, Sir John Maynard, F. L. Schuman, B. H. Sumner, G. Vernadsky, and Alfred Rambaud.

ROBERT K. GODWIN

Syracuse University

KULISCHER, EUGENE M. *Europe on the Move. War and Population Changes, 1917-47*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1947. 377 pp. Maps. \$5.00

This is a timely book for students of foreign politics and especially for those who are interested in the affairs of the International Refugee Committee. They, as well as historians, will find the book to be provocative. The author asserts that wars are often the fruit of the failure to regulate migration in behalf of surplus population of Europe. This was, according to the author, the situation on the eve of World War II. The attempt to substantiate the author's thesis with numerous facts borrowed from economics and sociology in various countries occupies about 60 percent of the book while the rest is devoted to population movement within Russia.

Students of Russia will find the book inspiring in many ways. A multitude of footnotes will induce them to read the original sources of Kulischer's arguments. They will find, however, that many Russian sources quoted by the author are not available anywhere in this country. After such an experience, they will welcome the book as a valuable reference which harbors a wealth of information concerning the social, economic, and political life of Europe, including Russia in the course of three eventful decades of the current century. Students of Russian population, moreover, will welcome the book as an interesting supplement to Frank Lorimer's work on Russian population which is so far indispensable for any student of demography of the U.S.S.R. While Lorimer confined himself almost exclusively to the demographic analy-

sis, Kulischer approached the problem from the socio-economic angle. Combining these two analyses would facilitate the task of the student who is handicapped by the failure of the Soviet government to publish any data on population movement during and after the war. Kulischer asserts that the mass migration of the Russian population to the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union belongs to the past for reasons similar to those explained by Ricardo in his Law of Rent. Limitation of Soviet funds brings about limitation in capacity to expand settlements within the Asiatic part of the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, Kulischer will have to agree that the industrial development of Asiatic Russia is taking place. He would have taken ground from under his opponents had he dwelt on various other problems at the expense of his arguments showing the limitation of agricultural expansion beyond the Urals. As a matter of fact, well over 50 percent of the Asiatic part of Soviet territory consists of land permanently frozen to various degrees. This makes large-scale settlements difficult inasmuch as construction and maintenance of buildings and utilities are much more costly than they are under more favorable conditions. Central Asia and the Far East have their own problems which require more capital in order to make life of emigrants from Europe as comfortable as it was in their homeland. For this matter, although the standard of living within the European part of the U.S.S.R. has never been high, and, in spite of population pressure in European Russia, the Soviet government is unable to induce a voluntary mass migration to the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union. Kulischer

would have filled a much-felt gap in the literature on the Soviet Union had he utilized more of the Russian material on physical geography and on municipal economy than he did to show his point, in itself a reasonable one, that the emigratory trend of the Russian population is towards the West, and that movement towards the East can be accomplished mainly by means of coercion. These are, however, relatively minor flaws in a book replete with valuable data, and the book should be included in the collection of "must" readings on Russia. The very interesting bibliography should not be overlooked.

MYRON K. GORDON

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WALSH, WARREN B. (Editor). *Readings in Russian History*. Syracuse, N. Y., Syracuse University Press, 1948. 549 pp. \$5.00.

One of the greatest handicaps in teaching Russian history to American undergraduates has been the lack of adequate reading in the form of secondary materials and sources. Few libraries are equipped with any extensive selection of books on Russia before the twentieth century, and fewer yet of the books available can be purchased in quantity on the market. Many useful volumes on Russia written during the past decade or two are already out of print, while classic accounts of earlier generations have long been unavailable. The Everyman's Library has rendered a service by keeping its edition of Hakluyt's *Voyages* in print, but this is a rare exception; even such standard collections as Wiener's *Anthology* are very difficult to obtain. Professor Walsh has,

therefore, made an important contribution by preparing a collection of readings which goes a long way towards filling this gap.

This selection of *Readings in Russian History* was compiled with college students particularly in mind, and in making his choice of materials, Professor Walsh was guided by his experience in teaching Russian history at Syracuse University. The selection covers the period from ancient times to the Revolution of 1917. About two-thirds of the volume is devoted to source material, in which category the editor includes such accounts as D. M. Wallace's *Russia* and G. Kennan's *Siberia*. For the period before the nineteenth century the sources include such materials as the *Chronicle of Nestor*, Giles Fletcher, Manstein's *Memoirs*, Tooke's *Life of Catherine*, and some of Catherine's own writings. For the nineteenth century, the editor has relied for his source material primarily on Czartoryski (21 pages), Haxthausen (13 pages), Wallace (88 pages), and Williams (20 pages). There are also briefer selections from De Choiseul, the Wilmots' *Russian Journals*, Kennan, Witte, and Pobedonostsev. The secondary material is equally varied, and includes selections from the standard accounts of Schuyler, Kluchevsky, Kovalevsky, Vinogradoff, Waliszewski, and Mavor, as well as several contrasting interpretations from the Marxist point of view by such Soviet historians as Pokrovsky and Sheshtakov.

Professor Walsh's *Readings* thus gives a good cross-section of the materials on Russian history with which beginning students in Russian history should be familiar, and provides a good survey of Russian life and institutions. Some teachers will

doubtless prefer to have more material on Russian intellectual history or on other aspects of Russian civilization, but no anthology can satisfy all purposes and tastes. This compilation will greatly facilitate the teaching of Russian history, and should go through many editions.

C. E. BLACK

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CROSS, SAMUEL H. *Slavic Civilization Through The Ages*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1948. 195 pp. \$3.50.

In spite of the continuous impact of the Slav nations and of the Pan-Slavic ideology on the course of world history, American historiography has had no systematic study probing this field as a whole—although numerous such works have been published in German, French, and in Slavic languages.

Such works as *Slavonic Nations of Yesterday and Today*, 1925, edited by Milivoy S. Stanoyevich, was only a collection of readings and not very systematic in its selection of topics, while the volume edited by Alexander Kaun and Ernest J. Simmons, *Slavic Studies*, had distinguished contributions but was not, again, a systematic study of the whole field.

Hence, to the best of the reviewer's knowledge, Cross' small volume has the distinction of being the first unified approach to this all-important field in English. In a broad field, he paints the picture of the rise, fall, and re-emergence of the three branches of the Slavic people—the Eastern, the Western, and the Southern—throughout the processes

of their expansion in northern and central Europe, the Balkans, and the great area now occupied by European Russia.

The treatment is not, however, without its weaknesses. Although Cross probably had no intention of including any bibliographical references, they would have been more than useful here, considering the differences of opinion still existing among the specialists on such topics as the original home of the Slavs, why and under what circumstances the parting of the Slavs took place, etc. Hardly anything is said about the impact of the Slavs living in non-Slavic countries, and especially their relations to the course of history of their respective homelands. Particularly strange is the author's statement in regard to the post-World War I history of the Slavic states: "If there is any lesson to be learned from the experience of the last thirty years, it is that setting up a series of economically weak national states solely on the basis of romantic ideals and strategic aims is no guarantee of peace" (p.183). Why this geopolitical knowledge sponsored by Haushofer's clique is so attractive to Cross, why he blames the small Slav nations more for what they suffered than for what they did and intended is something difficult to explain.

But to the credit of Cross is the broad sweep with which he treats the subject, the great cultural contributions of the Germans to their Slavic neighbors, and his ability to demonstrate the basic similarity of Slavic cultures. Strakhovsky's editing of this volume is excellent.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

University of Bridgeport

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

- BRUFORD, W. H. *Chekov and His Russia*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1948. 233 pp. \$4.25.
- Calendar of Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1917-1941*. Comp. by Jane Degras, London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948. 248 pp. \$4.50.
- DALLIN, DAVID J. *Soviet Russia and the Far East*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948. 398 pp. \$5.00.
- Eastern Review; A Survey of the Cultural Life of East Central and South-Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union*. Ed. by F. H. Schmidt. Vol. I, No. 1, April 1948. Liebiggasse 5, Vienna.
- The Economy of the U. S. S. R. During World War II*. By N. A. Voznesensky. The Russian Translation Program of the A. C. L. S., Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1948. 115 pp. \$3.00.
- FEDOTOV, G. P. (Ed.). *A Treasury of Russian Spirituality*, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1948. 501 pp. \$6.50.
- FISCHER, RUTH. *Stalin and German Communism; A Study in the Origins of the State Party*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948. 687 pp. \$8.00.
- GERSHEVSKY, NOAH D. *Scientific Russian Reader*, New York, Pitman, 1948. 253 pp.
- GLIKSMAN, JERZY. *Tell the West*, New York, Gresham Press, 1948. 358 pp. \$3.75.
- GOUZENKO, IGOR. *The Iron Curtain*, New York, Dutton, 1948. 280 pp. \$3.00.
- HECHT, DAVID. *Russian Radicals Look to America, 1825-1894*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1947. 242 pp. \$4.00.
- HOLTZMAN, FILIA. *The Young Maxim Gorky, 1868-1902*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948. 256 pp. \$3.00.
- The Ideological Content of Soviet Literature*. By A. M. Egolin. The Russian Translation Program of the A. C. L. S., Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1948. 22 pp. \$5.00.
- KORIAKOV, MIKHAIL. *I'll Never Go Back*, translated by Nicholas Wreden, New York, Dutton, 1948. 248 pp. \$3.00.
- KUNITZ, JOSHUA. (Ed.). *Russian Literature Since the Revolution*, New York, Boni and Gaer, 1948. 932 pp. \$6.00.
- KUZMINSKAYA, TATYANA. *Tolstoy As I Knew Him*, New York, Macmillan, 1948. 439 pp. \$5.00.
- MARGOLD, STELLAK. *Let's Do Business with Russia: Why We Should and How We Can*, New York, Harper, 1948. 244 pp. \$3.50.
- MATTHIessen, F. O. *From the Heart of Europe*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1948. 194 pp. \$3.00.
- NAGY, FERENC. *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain*, New York, Macmillan, 1948. 471 pp. \$6.00.

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- PARGMENT, LILA. *Beginner's Russian Reader*, New York, Pitman, 1948. 209 pp.
- ROBERTS, LESLIE. *Home from the Cold Wars*, Boston, The Beacon Press, 1948. 224 pp. \$2.50.
- SHUB, DAVID. *Lenin: A Biography*, New York, Doubleday, 1948. 438 pp. \$5.00.
- Soviet Interpretation of Contemporary American Literature*. By M. Mendelson. The Russian Translation Program of the A. C. L. S., Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1948. 26 pp. \$.50.
- Soviet Views on the Post-War World Economy*. Trans. by Leo Gruliow. The Russian Translation Program of the A. C. L. S., Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1948. 125 pp. \$3.00.
- TOWSTER, JULIAN. *Political Power in the U. S. S. R., 1917-1947*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1948. 443 pp. \$6.00.
- VAKAR, N. P. *The Study of Meaning in Russian; Selected Readings*, Harvard University, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, 1948.
- VERNADSKY, GEORGE. *Kievan Russia*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948. 412 pp. \$5.00.

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